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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Egyptian-American relationship is complex and problematic on many levels
and, similar to Arab-American relations as a whole, often draws the attention of policy
makers and academics within political science and its subfield of international relations.
Previous analyses of this topic have focused on the dimensions surrounding US policies
in the Middle East and the consequences of these policies on both the US and the Arab
region. These studies range from being scathingly critical, such as Gregory’s The
Colonial Present, to advocating for a US foreign policy that is based in rational pursuit of
interests that overlooks the discontent of the “Arab street,” as written by David Pollack.1
They also vary in their theoretical underpinnings; ranging from postcolonial studies,
foreign policy analysis, political economy, to realist international relations and security
studies. However, regardless of where they are anchored theoretically, most of these
studies focus almost entirely on analyzing US actions, their effects, and providing followon prescription or critique directed towards the US.
As a result, there exists an underlying assumption that the United States, generally
due to its capacity as the world’s only super-power, is ultimately the most important
entity that can affect change within the context of the Arab-American (and EgyptianAmerican) relationship. However, this thesis questions such an approach. It raises a
number of questions that this approach seems to ignore; are not all relationships a twoway street, even if they are asymmetrical in nature? What is the Egyptian side of the story
in building and developing this relationship? What is the Egyptian contribution to- and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1

Pollack, David, et al., “Actions, Not Just Attitudes: A New Paradigm for U.S. Arab Relations,” The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 2010.
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impact on- the dynamics of the relationship? Why are Egyptians and/or Arabs generally
depicted as passive objects or receivers (whether as solely victims, or as only allowed to
react and not to initiate action or discourse) within the context of this relationship? Is this
perspective silencing half of the story? Why is it assumed that one side of the
relationship, even if asymmetrical in nature, has little or no relevance? Tracing the
contours of asymmetrical power relations involves looking beyond one “side” of the
relationship. As Foucault mentions, even within a nexus of power there exists pockets of
resistance, even if “this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to
power.”2 This resistance may even be substantial enough to cause “radical ruptures.” In
dealing with these questions, this thesis attempts to address the Egyptian side of the
equation as a relevant and meaningful player within the relationship, and therefore fills a
gap in the literature dealing with Arab-American relations.
Particularly at the time of writing, questions surrounding the status of EgyptianAmerican relations and how the ‘United States’ is represented in Egyptian discourse has
become a salient topic. Post-January 25th Egypt has witnessed what has been perceived as
a new surge of the depiction of the ‘United States’ as a ‘foreign hand’ with a ‘hidden
agenda.3’ Understanding how prior representations of the ‘United States’ have been
constructed, changed, or utilized in the past is quite relevant to the current circumstances
and the “crisis of Egyptian-American relations” and how the ‘United States’ has
functioned in the role of ‘other’ to the Egyptian ‘self.’ Additionally, analyzing how

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2

Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 95.
Trew, Bel, “The Third Man in Egypt,” al-Ahram Online, 24 February 2012.
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/1/35184/Egypt/The-third-man-Egyptian-fears-of-the-foreignplot.aspx
3
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Egyptian discourses structure social reality is also a pertinent issue as Egypt continues its
transitional path in the heart of the “Arab Spring.”

A. Analyzing The Arab-American Relationship
Though the current status of Egyptian-American and the larger Arab-American
relations are frequently depicted as complicated and rocky, this predicament was not
necessarily always the case. Scholars like Ussama Makdisi4 and Michael Oren,5 have
portrayed the beginning of the Arab-American relationship in the 19th century as having
the potential for a fruitful future due to the fact that the US was not initially perceived as
a hostile and occupying nation like the European colonial powers. However, as multiple
works have argued, the hope that came with this beginning was soon smashed and the
relationship has since been fraught with difficulties, tensions, misunderstandings, and
exploitation. According to Rashid Khalidi, over the course of the relationship and
particularly since the Second World War, the United States effectively stepped into the
shoes of the old colonial European powers and engaged in its own particular brand of
amnesic imperialism- a history of foreign intervention always conveniently forgotten, or
silenced by discourse. As Britain and France did before, the United States dominated and
continues to dominate the region militarily, economically, and culturally, although its
forms of domination have donned different shapes than the overtly colonial past.6
Overlapping Khalidi’s perspective is the prevailing argument that the US has
pursued its foreign policies in the region based exclusively upon its strategic interests and

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Makdisi, Faith Misplaced.
Oren, Michael, Power, Faith, and Fantasy.
6
Khalidi, Resurrecting Empire.
5
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not the liberal values that often permeate US official discourse about itself.7 As Little
articulates in his wide survey of America’s past in the Middle East, throughout the ColdWar and afterward, decision-makers in the United States consistently employed foreign
policies in the region based in stability and strategic interests, oil, Israel’s interests, and,
in recent history, a promotion of liberal ideology. US policy makers have rarely taken
Arab interests into consideration when designing their foreign policy for the region.8
According to this perspective, the US in its fight against communism and later terrorism9,
pursued policies that more often than not forsook the democracy and freedom that the
United States is touted to espouse, bolstered repressive authoritarian regimes, and failed
to adequately address the critical issue of Palestine.
The question has been asked as to why such policies have been implemented for
such a sustained period of time, critiquing what is generally represented as an unbalanced
and unfair relationship. Though it is not the only possible framework for analysis, many
scholars (often within postcolonial studies) have attempted to answer this question
through analyzing representations of the Middle East and Arabs, such as Gregory’s use of
“imaginative geographies,” that are prevalent within US discourse. Such a frame of
analysis requires looking beyond the material, economic, and state power-relations; or
domains that generally constitute the core areas of analyses in inter-state relations.
There are certainly a multitude of factors that constrain and enable actors within
the dynamics of the Arab-American relationship and a variety of tools in which to
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7

See the U.S. 2010 National Security Strategy. "And we reject the notion that lasting security and
prosperity can be found by turning away from universal rights--- democracy does not merely represent our
better angels, it stands in opposition to aggression and injustice, and our support for universal rights is both
fundamental to American leadership and a source of our strength in the world." Obama, Barack, in The
White House, National Security Strategy, (Washington DC: Government Printing House, May 2010).
8
Little. American Orientalism.
9
Khalidi, Rashid, Sowing Crisis, 218.
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highlight these elements, one of which is analyzing discourse. From this perspective
(generally regarded as post-structuralist), the representations found in discourse, be it
popular, academic, and political (all over-lapping), exact a significant impact in how
actors understand and produce their social reality. But, perhaps of more significance,
such representations are said to both enable and constrain their available courses of
action.
Given that our understanding of conflict, war, or, more generally, the space within
which international politics is deployed is always mediated by modes of
representation and thus by all the various mechanisms involved in text
construction- grammar, rhetorics, and narrativity- we must operate with a view of
politics that is sensitive to textuality.10
In other words, the political struggle itself is one over definitions, representations, the
grammatical rules of how a discourse is structured, and identities (all inter-related) rather
than simply material and economic factors.

Therefore, analyzing politics means

analyzing discourse, being sensitive to its “textuality,” or how representations and
meanings are constructed through their arrangement with other texts, meanings, and
representations.
In this view, politics itself is a struggle over definitions and meanings and their
arrangement with each other, because such factors aid in legitimizing courses of action,
affect the material and economic spheres, and have other consequences. This struggle
does not occur simply within political realms but also extends into the greater arena of
popular culture, media, etc. Discourse and the representations found within it, constitute a
domain that actors both struggle to define and control, and enables and constrains their
action whether actors are conscious of it or not. “In analyzing these patterns, the analyst
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10

Shapiro, Michael, “Textualizing Global Politics,” in Der Derian, Shapiro, International/ Intertextual
Relations, 12.
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is describing not a world ‘out there,’ independent of human meaning, but rather how
social meanings themselves constitute the parameters of a particular world.”11 Therefore,
these elements exist in a reciprocal relationship that shapes our world and the
distributions of power within it; they are productive. However, “[t]he fact that every
object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a
world external to thought, or with the realism/idealism opposition.”12 There is no
suggestion in this type of analysis that there exist no other physical and independent
elements at work. Finally, analyzing the dynamics of discourse is assumed to accomplish
a key emancipatory goal of critical theory: through casting a light on the boundaries and
constraints that shape social reality (which, ultimately, is produced by man) we are better
able to understand and possibly exact control over such dynamics in order to dismantle
structures of domination.13

B. Critique of US Discourse in Arab-American Relations
As previously discussed, a significant amount of work has been accomplished in
understanding the political implications of discourse in the Arab-American relationship.
Usually these analyses, which generally fall within the school of postcolonial studies and
critique of Orientalism, extensively critique US academic, popular, and official discourse
about the Arab ‘other’ (or opposite of the ‘self’) and the resulting implications from these
constructions. According to this perspective, generally regarded as having first been
articulated in a comprehensive manner by Edward Said, the ability to carry out policies
abroad that seem contradictory to American values at home, in addition to the execution
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11

Fierke, Critical Approaches to International Security, 85.
Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 108.
13
Campbell, David, “Poststructuralism,” in International Relations Theories, 223.
12
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of America’s preventative wars, has been enabled by and interwoven with a continuing
discourse and representation of the Middle East that supposes authoritative ‘knowledge’
about the area. This discourse of what America ‘knows’ about the Middle East is
intertwined throughout the political, academic, and cultural spheres and is constitutive of
the production and reproduction of the American ‘self(s)’ through a process of alterity (or
otherness).14 Moreover, this discourse and its resulting identities produce a hierarchical
ordering of the world, which is composed of a superior ‘us’ and a lesser ‘them.’
According to this criticism of US discourse, this American identity often revolves
around the construction of “American exceptionalism” and is dangerously paired with the
U.S. public’s amnesiac tendency to forget their nation’s past adventures in the Middle
East, which are characterized as neither exceptional nor in line with purported American
values. The hierarchical ordering of the world allows the values and ideals appropriate
‘inside’ the borders of the United States (freedom, democracy, human rights, etc.) to be
rendered moot and inappropriate for the world ‘outside’ the borders.
Furthermore, the US government requires a certain amount of public support and
approval to be able to pursue any policy abroad for a sustained period of time. The
negative representation of the Middle East in discourse has long fueled a public
apprehension towards Islam and the Arabs, often negating the relevance of the actual
political grievances that Arabs might hold. According to this argument, such negative
representations function as legitimizing tools for America’s policies in the region. This
culture of apprehension does not produce merely an “unfortunate” and “closed-minded”
categorization of the world, but has political and material repercussions. Culture is coproduced with geographies of politico-economic power and military violence. “[C]ulture
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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underwrites power even as power elaborates culture. It follows that culture is not a mere
mirror of the world. Culture involves the production, circulation, and legitimization of
meanings through representations, practices, and performances that enter fully into the
constitution of the world.”15 The ability to ‘know’ Arabs (and/or Muslims) as radical and
irrational avoids recognizing any legitimacy to Arab claims and discredits resistances
“merely by using the slur of ‘exoticism’ against the lexicon employed by those who are
voicing them.”16 Or, in other words, by declaring such resistances as stemming for
“irrational” sources such as ‘Islam’ or labeling them as “terrorism,” any underlying
grievances are silenced.
As Edward Said discusses in Covering Islam, in American popular discourse,
such as film and media, Arabs have for decades been demonized as crazy, irrational
terrorists, greedy oil sheikhs, and other stereotypes.17 Or, as Little writes, “A quick look
at how Arabs have been depicted in everything from pulp fiction to television during the
past twenty years confirms that orientalism American style remained alive and well in
both popular culture and mass media.”18 Short media clips about the region are generally
restricted to images of violence, political upheaval, and poverty. It is a “scary” and
inherently unstable region. “They have been fighting for thousands of years and will
continue to do so” is one of the most enduring assessments. Fierke notes that, “One way
of ensuring legitimacy is to naturalize and conventionalize a particular association as
‘reality’ and therefore part of the assumed world of a culture.”19 In this respect, the
preponderance of negative imagery about the Middle East and the Arabs and their
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Gregory, The Colonial Present, 8.
Burgat, Islamism in the Shadow of Al Qaeda, 8.
17
Said, Covering Islam, 6.
18
Little, American Orientalism, 36.
19
Fierke, Critical Approaches to International Security, 86.
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representation as “unstable,” “irrational,” “angry,” “barbaric,” and “dangerous” are
projected into naturalized landscape of “reality” for Americans. Or, as David Campbell
discusses, “the boundaries of a state’s identity are secured by the representation of a
danger integral to foreign policy.”20
Gregory takes this argument further in suggesting that such a representation of the
Arab “reality” allows the American public to feel comfortable in the assertion that the US
is justified and has the moral high ground in its continued intervention abroad and waging
“The War on Terror.” These representations are more complex and powerful than simple
stereotypes. Boundaries of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ are also produced through visibility and
invisibility. While the media’s coverage of September 11 was personal and intimate, the
displays of America’s following wars were contrastingly distant and computerized. The
Arab was “anonymized” and placed in a state of invisibility. It was not the Iraqis and
Afghans who were dying- objectives were being met, targets were being destroyed.
Warfare was being fought and projected onto television screens through the imagery of a
video game and with the bravado of a reality show. It was only when the media wanted to
project an image of a “grateful Iraqi people” that selective and intimate footage was
shown of Iraqis. Through its selection of images to display on screen, the US media
ensured that the American public would see itself as the hero in a sort of Hollywood
Western and never see or remember the hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians who lost
their lives as a result of a war that was begun and legitimized on what Gregory perceives
as false premises.21 Ten years later, 9/11 continues to serve as the newest justification for

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Campbell, David, Writing Security, 3.
Gregory, The Colonial Present, 198-199.
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an interventionist and militarized foreign policy and is burned in US popular memory as
what happens when ‘they’ are not properly managed and controlled by ‘us.’
As is discussed extensively by Said and additionally by Lockman, it is not in the
domain of popular culture alone where such representations are produced and
reproduced. At a deeper level and perhaps more importantly is academia’s
institutionalized ‘knowledge’ about the Arab world. Such ‘knowledge’ is always
endowed with a voice that makes it appear to have a more authoritative and substantial
claim in representing “reality,” potentially making it more potent. The intellectual circles
within American society are intimately intertwined with similar negative representations
of the Middle East. Academia is permeated with think tanks and the voices of scholars
like Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington, and Daniel Pipes who echo the same media pop
culture messages in a more eloquent and “intellectually appealing” form: there is
something fundamentally different, timeless, and essential within Islam and Arab
culture22 that prevents them from being like ‘us,’ and we must find away to “guide” them,
“modernize” them, “Westernize” them, so that they are not a threat. The development of
the field of Middle East Studies itself originated from traditional Orientalist scholarship
(focused primarily in languages and classic Islamic civilization rather than contemporary
circumstances) and was always linked to government interests, and driven to produce
policy relevant knowledge that was directed towards searching for the internal
characteristics that caused ‘them’ to be behind.23
The hypotheses of why the Arabs have “missed the boat” range from pointing to a
deficient component within Islam, to a propensity towards a strong or a weak civil
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22

For more elaboration see Sadowski, Yahya. “The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate,” Middle
East Report 183, no. 183 (July 1, 1993): 14-40.
23
Lockman, Contending Visions, 100-148.
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society (depending on which is in intellectual fashion as the correct recipe for
democracy24), or the medieval Arab rejection of Greek rationalism. The general
prognosis within critique of US discourse is that regardless of the reason of the day,
within American hegemonic discourse, both popular and academic, Arabs are
consistently represented as irrational, backward, authoritarian, resistant in liberal
economic reform, lacking in regard for individual rights, women’s liberation, religious
freedom, etc.; ironically many of the elements that American policies in the region are
portrayed as complicit in causing. Most importantly, the fact that Arabs are represented
as such in the dominant discourse has political and military consequences for the region,
not the least of which being a continued justification for foreign intervention.
As was previously mentioned, all of these intricate and illuminating critiques have
consistently focused on US discourse; in other words, the US as the main actor and target
audience whose discourse and representations take primacy in analysis. From a normative
perspective, the implications of such a narrative point towards the need for drastic
realization, self-critique, and change on the part of the hegemonic power, or the United
States. But what if this realization never occurs and, as Gregory phrases, the powerknowledge structures of the colonial past continue to be projected into the colonial
present? Is this, then, the end of the story according to these perspectives? Should it be
assumed that only the hegemon is the relevant actor? How does one located on the
“margins” by the dominant discourse interact with it and contest it? Is it the plight of
Arabs to always be regarded as the passive objects of such discourse and its political and
material consequences? This thesis argues that this situation is not necessarily the case.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24

Sadowski, Yahya. “The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate,” Middle East Report 183, no. 183
(July 1, 1993): 14-40.
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C. Research Questions and Agenda
As was previously mentioned, even within the dominant discourse there is
presumed to exist pockets of resistance. This thesis locates and identifies such resistances
in the Egyptian context. Although there exist other means and frames of analysis to
address the dynamics of the Egypt-American relationship, including analyzing Egypt as a
relevant player, this study is restricted to the realm of discourse and representation, and
attempts to fill the gap left by prior works that have focused on this element of the
relationship. It is an attempt to analyze and give voice to Egyptian discourse that is
related to the Egyptian relationship with America and tied ultimately to the continuous
production of Egyptian identity. It assumes that the discourse from the non-hegemonic
power is in fact relevant and productive. It also assumes that such discourses enhance and
constrain possible courses of action. Such assumptions have produced the following
research questions to guide the analysis:

How do Egyptians who shape the representations of the ‘United States’ define it
in their discourse? Do these discourses and speech acts place the ‘United States’ into the
role of ‘other’ as part of the continuous struggle to define the Egyptian ‘self’ and
identity? What are these various constructions of the Egyptian ‘self’ and identity that
emerge from public discourses? What are the exclusions created in these definitions?
How is the dominant discourse interacted with, taken on, challenged, and potentially
transformed? Which discourses seem the most productive in transcending the colonial
binaries of the past and which discourses serve as a reinforcement of current knowledgepower equations?

!

12!

In order to address these questions, the analysis focuses on Egyptian popular25
discourse and its various representations of the ‘United States’ and ‘Egypt,’ and their
relationship to each other, over the course of three events: President Obama’s speech in
Cairo on June 4th 2009, Osama bin Laden’s death on May 2nd 2011, and the Israeli
Defense Force (IDF) clash on the Israeli-Egyptian border on 19 August 2011. These three
events were selected because they fall in the most recent two years and are likely to have
generated discourse about the United States and/or Egyptian identity in relation to the
United States. One of the events is President Obama’s speech in Cairo and is a “text” in
and of itself and is addressed extensively by the analyzed texts. The materials for this
research project are the editorials and opinion articles in three major Egyptian
newspapers that are representative of different interests: al-Ahram Weekly as the state and
establishment, al-Masry al-Youm as mainstream independent, and al-Dostor as populist
(though it is noted that it changed in ownership and in nature in 2007). In this project,
media is regarded as a public forum for popular discourse amongst Egyptian civil society,
particularly where Egyptian intellectuals have a space to articulate their perspectives.
Therefore media-framing is not involved in the framework of analysis. The events cover
a time period before and after the 25 January revolution in order to capture the shift in
perspective and the increase in the plurality of voices since the collapse of the previous
regime and a renewed desire to redefine Egypt and its place in world politics.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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By popular discourse I mean the dominant discourse found in Egyptian newspapers. It is understood that
access to publish in these newspapers, or the rules that determine who can be heard, is restricted to a
specific group of elite individuals. In effect, the discourse itself chooses the authors. Therefore, this thesis
is an analysis of representations within Egyptian dominant discourse, in addition to its relationship with
American dominant discourse. However, unless otherwise noted in this thesis, the term dominant discourse
is in reference to American discourse.
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With the exception of President Obama’s speech in Cairo, all events were
analyzed from the day after their occurrence until two weeks after. As the first Obama
speech was anticipated, the week prior and after was analyzed in order to capture
reactions before and after the event. Therefore, the research includes a total of six weeks
worth of op-eds from three newspapers. Though the results of this thesis are limited in
range and are case-specific, they reveal a multiplicity of representations of ‘Egypt’ and
‘United States,’ or ‘self’ and ‘other,’ many of which appear to have implications for how
actors engage in Egyptian-American relations (some much different than others).
This thesis consists of six chapters. The second chapter reviews the literature
pertinent to this research, and the theory and methodology utilized in analyzing Egyptian
discourse as well as the working assumptions and hypotheses of this research (based on
the information garnered from preliminary research). Chapters three, four and five
include the analyses of Egyptian popular discourse from the three chosen events, in
addition to preliminary discussions of their implications. The concluding chapter
synthesizes the findings from the analysis of Egyptian discourse during (or relevant to)
these three events. It also identifies the thesis’ core argument of how representations of
the ‘United States’ have functioned in Egyptian discourse and therefore influenced the
Egyptian-American relationship. It concludes with preliminary observations about the
how these representations produce Egypt’s ‘relations’ with America, which ultimately
enable and constrain action.
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CHAPTER 2
THEORY, METHODOLOGY, AND LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter discusses the history of previous scholarly work, starting with
Edward Said’s Orientalism, that has addressed the implications of the colonial-colonized
discourse, of which the Arab-American relationship is but one piece. It then expands on
the theoretical frameworks within this broader category, ultimately ending in the chosen
theoretical framework and methodology for this thesis. The chapter ends with an
additional literature review, covering topics identified as relevant after the establishment
of the theoretical and methodological framework and the refinement of the research
questions.

A. Can the Subaltern Speak? Postcolonial Theory and its Shortcomings
The field of postcolonial studies has extensively addressed the implications of the
dominant Western or imperialist discourse and how it has enabled the goals of
colonialism and is one of the primary sources for critique of discourse in the ArabAmerican relationship. Academic works in this field, specifically critique of Orientalism,
generally analyze how current Western knowledge structures perpetuate hierarchical
representations of the Arab world (or a greater Orient), and how these structures of
knowledge and power intertwine between academic and political realms, and therefore
help facilitate foreign policies, and other actions that are detrimental and unfair to Arabs.
The central theme within the critique of Orientalism, first introduced by Edward Said, is
that Western Orientalist discourse, which remains inherently about domesticating and
ruling over a stagnant and unchanging ‘Orient,’ has political and material repercussions,
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not the least of which is causing powerlessness or limited agency on the part of the
colonized ‘other.’ Furthermore, Orientalist discourse, is generated from itself and
throughout its existence has never been grounded in and reflective of the real and
material ‘Orient’ of which it is purported to be an authority on. In other words, Orientalist
discourse is completely Western in origin and ultimately about the ‘West’ and its
construction of ‘self’ and not about the ‘Orient.’26
Edward Said’s classic critique of Orientalism was naturally the catalyst for a wave
of studies in postcolonialism and critical theory, including studies that elaborated on and
critiqued his original premises. Sadiq al-Azm’s “Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse”
suggested that Said was guilty of essentializing culture himself or what Al-Azm calls
“Orientalism in Reverse.”27 Through tracing Orientalist origins back to the time of the
Homer and the ancient Greek representations of Asia, Said committed the same sin of
essentializing the ‘West’ and more specifically the scholarly field of Orientalism. AlAzm also went on to be one of the main critics of “Occidentalism,” another term for
essentialization of the ‘West’ that is often utilized by Arab intellectuals. Hasan Hanafi, an
Egyptian intellectual, actually called for establishing Occidentalism (Istighrab) as an
institutional field of study to accomplish a reverse of what Orientalist discourse did to the
‘East.’28 Al-Azm criticizes this approach for emulating Orientalism, originating from
politics of resentment and an inferiority complex, and relying on the same binary of
West/Orient.29
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Said, Orientalism.
Al-Azm, Sadik J. “Orientalism and Orientalism in Reverse.” In Alexander Lyon Macfie, ed.,
Orientalism: A Reader, 217-28. New York University Press, 2000.
28
Al-Azm, “Orientalism and Conspiracy” in Graf, Arndt, Ludwig Paul, Shirin Fatḥi, and
Ṣadiq Jalal ʻAẓm (Ed.). Orientalism & Conspiracy. I.B. Tauris, 2011.
29
Ibid.
27
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Other scholars, such as Aijaz Ahmed and Benita Parry, critiqued Said’s stance for
its wholesale reliance on discourse analysis which ultimately pushes the inquirer away
from the actual material and economic conditions that the colonial discourse is accused of
producing and controlling.30 Further critique asked questions regarding whether there is a
diversification within colonial discourse, implying that it is an oversimplification to
suggest that it operates in the same fashion throughout space and time.31 Other scholars
such Bhabha and Spivak look for ways to transcend colonial/orientalist hegemonic
discourse; Bhabha32 through ‘ambivalence’ and ‘hybridity,’ Spivak through “counterknowledges.”
According to Homi Bhabha, who has expanded the realm of postcolonial theory,
studies in postcolonialism or critical theory should aim to transcend the binaries initially
established by colonial discourse. Or, it
[A]ttempts to revise those nationalist or ‘nativist’ pedagogies that set up the
relation of Third World First World in a binary structure of opposition. The
postcolonial perspective resists the attempt at holistic forms of social explanation.
It forces a recognition of the more complex cultural and political boundaries that
exist on the cusp of these often opposed political spheres.33
However, the vast majority of postcolonial studies position Western discourse as the only
target of deconstruction, thus neglecting the voice and resistance of the colonized subject,
limiting the potential depth of analysis and the ability to transcend binaries. Said later
acknowledged this deficiency in his follow on work, Culture and Imperialism. While he
mentions that the ‘colonized’ have always engaged in acts of resistance34, his primary
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source for depictions of resistance came from Western texts such as Austen’s Mansfield
Park and not from the works of Arab authors.
The tension between the substantive popularity of Said as a face of Arab culture
and the sense among Arab literary studies scholars that he said far too little about
the actual culture produced in the region parallels an older and more conceptual
tension between colonial discourse analysis as pure critique of the West’s gaze,
and a need for a critical approach to the arts and ideas of the region that makes
substantive statements about Arab actors.35
This approach towards Said’s work is the same critique previously made in the
introductory chapter of this thesis with respect to Arab-American relations: analysis
remains on the dominant discourse and the voice of the ‘other,’ and its resistance, is left
unstudied as a legitimate actor.
Concentrating inquiry on the Arab as only the object of discourse, once again,
places primacy in the ‘West.’ As a result, postcolonial studies then becomes an
exploration of Western discourse and the Western definition of ‘Self’ that uses
methodology from a Western intellectual tradition to reveal how this discourse
perpetuates asymmetrical structures of power on the ‘other.’ The ‘other’ simply serves as
a body for the ‘West’ to critique itself against. Focusing only on Western discourse does
not generate inquiry into the material and actual conditions of the ‘other’ or give the
‘other’ an adequate role to play as a recipient and mutual shaper, or resistor, of this
discourse. Similar to the colonial discourse that it critiques, postcolonial studies place the
‘other’s text “forever the exegetical horizon of difference, never the active agent of
articulation.36” In many ways postcolonialism as an institutional discipline actually
depends on the continued existence of the silenced, repressed, “good” ‘other,’ packaged
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together with its cultural difference, in order to better define the edges of the ‘West’ it
critiques.37 Or, to use Spivak’s term, it commits epistemic violence against the colonial
subject through consistently defining it as the ‘other’ and merely the shadow of the
‘self.’38
Proponents of Foucauldian notions of power, who comprise a significant portion
of the work in postcolonial studies, suggest that true resistance against the dominant
discourse is rare, if not impossible. Any resistance that does emerge will be incorporated
into the framework of the dominant discourse and thus rendered inconsequential. As
Spivak finds in her famous work39, the subaltern does not speak. The few works that do
engage in the cultural and intellectual history of the Arabs in a postcolonial context, such
as Joseph Mossad’s Desiring Arabs, demonstrate how modern Arab intellectual
discourses, both liberal and Islamist, absorbed Western frameworks and ontologies, such
as the homosexual as an ‘other,’ to the extent that they became primarily “discursive
derivatives of Europe.” Aboul-Ela asks if an over-fixation on the voice and agency of the
‘other’ eventually leads to essentialist notions of modernity, native culture, and blindness
to the impact of European colonialism and global capitalism on all contemporary
cultures. However, he also notes that postcolonialism is limited in its underlying premise
that history begins with the colonial encounter and may therefore have a tendency to
overlook elements of prior discourses. There are strands of intellectual tradition, culture,
and discourse, usually not readily accessible or visible to Western scholarship, which
continue to influence contemporary Arab thought.40 Moreover, Foucault himself
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acknowledged the inherent presence of resistance to power and Bhabha41 has since
elaborated on the tactics of mimicry, ambivalence, hybridity, and sly civility as a means
of subversion to slip past hegemonic holds. However, even Bhabha’s strategies of
resistance are contingent on the natural flaws found within the dominant discourse
(colonialism) and not a result of the colonial’s or other’s independent ability for
resistance.
Regardless of the reason or justification, postcolonial studies have often left
unexamined the possibility of the ‘other,’ or in the case of this thesis, the ‘Arab,’ as
author of discourses who, consequently, also produces constructions of ‘self’ and ‘other.’
It is left to rarified theoretical speculation as to whether these discourses also propagate
and repeat the same power-knowledge equations inherent in colonial discourse, or if the
resulting constructions have ramifications for action. An understanding of the constraints
and limitations on the other side of the presumed ‘Arab-West’ relationship is critical in
attempting to identify strategies for resistance. The silencing of the positively associated
‘other,’ the eternally enshrined under-dog, assumes that there is no recourse available for
resisting and changing the hegemonic representations from the ‘West’ unless it lies
within the discourse of the ‘West’ itself. As a result, postcolonialism “reproduces a
relationship of domination and is the most serious indictment of the institutional powers
of critical theory.”42 As the majority of postcolonial studies are focused on critiquing the
‘West,’ it is assumed that it is the ‘West’ who will have come to terms with its committed
faults and injustices after sufficient self-critique so that it can then change its own course
and, consequently, that of the passive world.
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The research questions in this thesis do not focus on a critique of the dominant
American discourse and therefore do not neatly fit in the field of postcolonial studies.
However, it is recognized that postcolonial studies and critique of the dominant discourse
has opened the space for the questions presented in this thesis. It has allowed the
representations and discourse of the original ‘other’ to become a salient and relevant
topic. As a result, this thesis is primarily in a dialogue with postcolonial studies, in search
of another angle or approach with which to illuminate the same issue. It is an attempt to
fill a new space that has been identified in studies of Arab-American relations and
postcolonial studies as a whole: the discourse, representations, and constructions of ‘self’
and ‘other’ for Arab, specifically Egyptian, actors. In such an approach, the theories and
scholarly works that concentrate on analyzing and understanding discourse, which are
essentially the same frameworks utilized in orientalism critiques, are still pertinent and
relevant. The lens is simply shifted to the other “side.”

B. Theory of Discourse and Discourse Analysis
Scholars working in discourse analysis vary in the extent that they embrace the
“linguistic turn.” Some scholars like Laclau and Mouffe choose to see everything as
discourse and relevant to social relations and reject the “thought/reality dichotomy.”43
Others, like Norman Fairclough and those within the school of critical discourse analysis,
see discourse analysis as relevant for many studies but not appropriate for everything,
such as understanding the economy. However, all of them agree that discourse constructs
our social reality, identities, social relations, and consequently interests, and power
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relations. In other words, the social world is not ontologically prior to discourse, but
mutually constitutive of it.44
According to Laclau and others generally placed in the post-structuralist school of
thought, the signs (or words) within discourse (or representations) are not innately
endowed with meaning but acquire it through their relations with other signs and
discourses. However, unlike what was argued by de Saussure, the relationship between
signs and the resultant meaning are not inherently fixed. In fact, they are always subject
to political struggle. Politics then becomes, ultimately, the struggle over meaning. These
meanings define the world while simultaneously excluding other meanings, identities,
and relations that could have been. Moreover, discourses and signs structure social reality
in a manner that benefits some and not others, making interests directly tied to and
produced by discourse and meaning.45
It is perhaps more beneficial to envision discourses as nets of signs that always
have the potential for being re-arranged, some signs having more potential than others to
shift depending on the historical circumstances and struggles. For example, with regards
to current Arab discourses, the sign ‘democracy’ might be tied to ‘West,’ ‘liberal,’
‘foreign,’ ‘heresy,’ ‘modernity,’ etc. or it might also be related to ‘Islamic,’ ‘indigenous,’
‘Arab,’ in the context of those who argue that ‘democracy’ has always been part of
‘Islamic’ thought and/or ‘Arab’ culture. There also exist signs and discourses that are
naturalized, or seen as an objective truth and are more stabile in their location (or unlikely
to be able to be contested), yet this does not mean that they could not have been arranged
in another fashion or that they are, in fact, an unalterable reality. They are heavy and
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resilient structures that are almost impossible to dismantle or alter, similar to something
like the global political economy, yet still owe their inception to man. Therefore,
depending on historical circumstances, not all signs have the same potential to shift in
meaning and attempts to do so can fall on deaf ears or make little sense. This situation
reflects the structural constraints within discourse and therefore the constraints in the
construction of meaning and social reality. Adding to this perspective, identities and
power-relations, which are generated from the current discourses and social reality, also
affect who has the ability to disrupt and challenge such configurations of meaning (the
relationship between discourse and social reality is a two-way street). Regardless events
can occur which upset the stability or hegemony of certain discourses and signs, thus
making it possible for them to be struggled over and rearticulated anew.46
From this point of view, analyzing discourse is ultimately an analysis of the
ongoing political struggle over meaning and consequently the struggle over the make-up
of our social reality. The purpose of discourse analysis then is to identify how particular
discourses arrange signs (or how they represent something) and the resultant meanings
and consequences. Usually this process involves identifying that which is taken for
granted as objective or is presented as a naturalized truth; that which is a hegemonic
discourse. According to Donna Gregory, “The first step in showing how a process, a
perspective, a concept, or a fact is socially constructed is to distance it, to make it seem
strange.”47 Through the process of “making strange,” other alternatives, realities, and
relationships that might have been possible are brought to light. Furthermore, identities or
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interests that are constructed by the discourse as mutually exclusive or antagonistic can
be shown as not inherently conflictive.
The task of the analyst is to look for the underlying assumptions that exist beneath
the surface of the discourse itself. Revealing underlying assumptions, or the relationships
of signs, also elucidates the implicit (and often asymmetrical) power relations and power
structures that are produced and used by these discourses. Questions that arise from this
process include: In whose interest is this arrangement of social reality? What are the
ongoing struggles between discourses over these meanings (or intertextuality)? What are
the resulting implications for power-relations between the entities and, what are the
stakes?
Deconstruction, pioneered by Jacques Derrida, is one of the processes used to
reveal the unstated and underlying assumptions, or arrangement of signs, within a text.
Often these arrangements are hierarchical and take the form of binaries, specifically
within the context of the ‘Western’ historical experience. A sign takes on meaning by
what it is not or through exclusion, thus creating binaries. Moreover, one object is usual
cast as preferable or hierarchical to the other, creating asymmetric relations.
Derrida explains that the deconstructive operation requires essentially two moves:
to reverse the hierarchy and to undo the pairing. The reversal is one part of the
deconstructive move. The other part is to displace the entire logocentric system
for that particular text or context.48
However, not all discourses contain hierarchical binaries. As previously mentioned, the
constructed social reality can be filled with over-lapping and/or non-antagonistic
representations and meanings.
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The struggle over meaning within discourse may often involve the process of
trying to transcend previously antagonistic representations by rearranging signs and
rearticulating the discourse. As mentioned by Bhabha, in the moment of disclosing or
representing one’s identity,
we are no longer confronted with an ontological problem of being but with the
discursive strategy of the moment of interrogation, a moment in which the
demand for identification becomes, primarily, a response to other questions of
signification and desire, culture and politics.49
In other words, there is no stable and ontologically prior identity that is the allencompassing source from which the discourse springs. Identity shifts and evolves in
each articulation, and is given meaning through the other signs in the discourse and in
response to the other’s discourse.
Furthermore, as Bhabha discusses at length, it is in the “third space of
articulation” and intersubjectivity that negotiation and reinscription occurs, and where
culture (and identity), defined at a problematic of difference, emerges in hybrid forms.
The concept of cultural difference focuses on the problem of the ambivalence of
cultural authority: the attempt to dominate in the name of a cultural supremacy
which is itself produced only in the moment of differentiation. And it is the very
authority of culture as a knowledge of referential truth which is at issue in the
concept and moment of enunciation.50
Such a perspective also calls into question any theories and conceptions that rest on a
notion of purity in identity or culture and problematizes studying identity and culture as a
coherent analytical category in and of itself. Therefore, if the analyst searches only for
hierarchical binaries within discourse, s/he is likely to miss an entire range of
articulations, meanings, and underlying assumptions which structure social reality. S/he
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will potentially miss the ongoing struggle over meaning within discourses, or what
Bhabha refers to as reinscription. Tracing the arrangements of signs, underlying
assumptions, locating what is presented as objective knowledge, in addition to locating
that which is struggled over between discourses, are the tasks of the analyst; some of
these items may or may not correspond to hierarchical binaries.
Finally, discourse analysis, like all areas in social science, struggles with the
agent-structure problem. This problem becomes apparent in the nature of discourse itself.
Analysis of a text does not require trying to unearth (if it were even possible) the author’s
true intent or meaning in the text but only focusing on the discourse and its relation to
other texts, possibly negating the relevance of the author all together or what is known as
“the death of the author.” Though we might figuratively hold an individual responsible
for the results of his or her text (and action), an author’s speech is always subject to
interpretation by others and it is these others, not simply the author, who produce its
results in their continuing discourse. Derrida makes the same observation:
The absence of the sender, of the receiver [destinateur], from the mark that he
abandons, and which cuts itself off from him and continues to produce effects
independently of his presence and of the present actuality of his intentions
[vouloir-dire] indeed even after his death, his absence, which moreover belongs to
the structure of all writing.51
However, not everyone agrees that focusing on the text implies a lack of human agency
to both produce and affect the meaning of discourse (and thus social reality). It does,
however, weaken the assumed direct connection between the author of a discourse (or
action) and the results in produces (and continued to produce). Hannah Arendt52 also
agrees that in spite of the fact that the author of a speech or action is generally encased
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with the end results it produces, as though these results were always intended by the
author, in actuality the author has no real control over the outcome of his or her
speech/action once it enters the intersubjective space that exists between humans. “In
other words, the stories, the results of action or speech, reveal an agent, but this agent is
not an author or producer. Somebody began it and is its subject in the twofold sense of
the word, namely, its actor and suffer, but nobody is its author.”53 Yet, in this view, the
initial spark to speak or to act, regardless of controlling results, did ultimately originate
from a person. The act of creating a text is still left to the author.
Even Edward Said, though often portrayed to the contrary, was not purely
Foucaultian in his analysis and critique of Orientalism. He was also influenced by
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony in addition to other thinkers.
In the years that followed the publication of Orientalism, Said tended to distance
himself from poststructuralism’s rather stark and bleak view of the human
condition and hope for a better world, instead embracing a more humanistic
position that sustained human agency, active political engagement and the
possibility of noncoercive, nondominating kinds of knowledge.54
It is in this humanistic spirit that this thesis has been undertaken: that resistance to and
relevant articulation outside the dominant discourse exist, and that structures of
domination have the potential to be altered, and that though identities may be constructed
through difference, they do not have to be antagonistic.

C. Methodology
The methodology utilized in this research does not follow a content analysis
approach but is based in the previously discussed literature which focuses on
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relationships between signs, struggles over meanings, underlying assumptions, and the
consequences of these arrangements; it is a hermeneutical approach. Content analysis that
relies on counting words or ideas and placing them predetermined categories was also not
chosen because it would have more directly placed the researcher’s preconceived biases
on the texts rather than investigating the texts beforehand to understand the
representations within them. Furthermore, categories tend to force the representations in
the text into binaries when this may not necessarily be the case in the text. Therefore,
analysis of the texts occurred in the form of a close read and extracting relevant
representations from the text (many of which occurred repetitiously) and questioning how
they functioned and how they were related to other representations.
More specifically, representations of ‘America,’ ‘United States,’ ‘Obama,’ etc.
(all falling under the broader category of Egyptian representations of the United States)
were the primary focus of the analysis. Once these representations related to the ‘United
States’ were identified, they were analyzed for how they functioned within the text. For
example, are they used as a contrast to Egyptian identity (stated or unstated)? Is identity
of the ‘self’ in the text ‘Egyptian’ or something else, such as Muslim, Arab, woman, etc?
Rather than assuming that these representations are always placed in a hierarchical binary
or wholly solidified as mutually exclusive, the arrangement of signs and representations
and underlying assumptions were freshly assessed in their relationships and “made
strange” if possible. Patterns and representations that occur more frequently than others
throughout the texts were also noted.55
Through tracing the negotiation of meaning and representations found in these
texts, and identifying the naturalized and unquestioned constructions of social reality
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(identities, relations, interests, etc.), in addition to the unstable signs that are subject to
political struggle, the research has attempted to identify underlying assumptions.
Moreover, the consequences for such representations are also assessed. Some of the
preliminary assumptions and questions asked included: In whose interest is this
discourse? Do Egyptian discourses relate to the hegemonic discourses emanating from
the United States? Do they repeat the same underlying assumptions as the US discourse?
Are they entirely oppositional in nature or do they transcend binaries based on exclusion?
How might they structure power-relations between the two entities or what actors
perceive as an available course of action?

D. Arabs Encounter the West
Analyzing Egyptian discourse about the ‘United States’ also requires a historical
background of the Arab and/or Egyptian encounter with the Western ‘other’ because it is
likely that the analyzed material will touch upon these themes and strands of thought. The
following section discusses works addressing the history of that encounter, the long
history of Arab intellectual search for the ‘self’ and cultural critique, and the more recent
history of perceptions of US foreign policy and the renegotiation or reinscription of
‘Western’ political concepts like ‘democracy.’
One of the first encounters between Arabs and the “modern” West usually cited
by Arab and Western scholars alike is that of the Egyptian and Al-Azhar sheik Rifa‘a
Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi who traveled to Paris during the time of Mohammed Ali and
subsequently published his Paris diaries known as Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Takhlis Bariz. His
account of Paris is a non-defensive description that often expresses curiosity and an
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admiration for a number of things he observes, including nationalism and the spread of
education. He does not seem to find European qualities threatening to his IslamicEgyptian identity or somehow contradictory to it. He also does not buy into them
wholesale and feel that the full package need somehow be incorporated in his own land.
His European encounter occurred before Europe began its colonial projects in the region
and revealed itself not as a friend but a technologically superior, invading threat.56
Other studies that cover the first Arab encounters with the modern West describe
the shock that was experienced by Arabs (and Ottomans/Turks) when realizing that they
were “behind” the suddenly threatening and superior Europe. The highly criticized
Bernard Lewis in his What Went Wrong traces this encounter back to the Ottoman
Empire experience and the sudden desire to assimilate as much as possible from
European modernity while simultaneously protecting Ottoman and Muslim identity.
Lewis asserts that this reaction is due to the “Muslim civilization” viewing itself as
superior and the inability of the “Muslim mind” to truly accept that an “infidel” was
capable of being so advanced. This mindset resulted in adopting a flawed manipulation of
modernity and an incorporation of only parts of it so that failure became the end result.
Though Lewis’s main thesis is reliant on essentialist civilizational categories, his
description of the resulting reaction, defensiveness, and angst produced by the Arab
encounter of a modern and threatening Europe points to some important elements of that
experience. Since the modern European encounter, many Arab writers and intellectuals
have consistently tried to address a nagging sentiment of feeling “behind.” This
experience was of course exacerbated when the threatening and technologically superior
Europe did invade and occupy the Arab homeland.
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Rashid El-Enany’s Arab Representations of the Occident is a study on the
portrayal of the East-to-West encounter in Arabic literature and is conducted in the same
spirit of Edward Said’s Orientalism. His study is, in effect, a reverse Edward Said.
According to El-Enany’s findings, Arab intellectuals over the course of two centuries
displayed a strong desire for emulation of an idealized ‘other.’ “To them the European
other was simultaneously an object of love and hate, a shelter and a threat, a usurper and
a giver, and enemy to be feared and a friend whose help is to be sought.”57 Additionally,
the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ were, similar to colonial discourse, frequently depicted as
having their own unique and stable essences. The ‘West’ was constructed as
technological and material, but lacking in spirituality. The ‘East’ was its opposite and had
a higher morality and spirituality. Therefore, it became a source of debate amongst Arab
thinkers as to what should be incorporated from the ‘West’ and what should be discarded.
Intellectuals like Ibrahim Abu Lughod attributed the condition of “falling behind” as a
failure to incorporate the ‘West’ as whole, including value and culture systems.58
As described by Makdisi59 and Oren60, the history of Arabs encountering
America initially took place in the Arab homeland when missionaries from the United
States first went abroad in the hopes of mass converting the “Holy Land.” The
missionaries eventually moved from purely evangelical tactics into education and,
whether it was their intention or not, became disseminators of the image of America and
its liberal and secular ideals. Their portrayal of America to the Arabs was highly
romanticized and this benevolent representation was generally embraced by the Arabs
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57

El-Enany, Arab Representations of the Occident, 2.
Ibid., 8.
59
Makdisi, Faith Misplaced, 55-203.
60
Oren, Power, Faith and Fantasy, 80-97.
58

!

31!

whom they educated because the United States was not seen as a colonizing power at that
time. Arabs later began to emigrate to the United States and “sharpened” their vision of
the country as stories began to flow back home. Nevertheless, “American prosperity, not
American imperialism, emerged as the first great, enduring Arab stereotype of fin-desiècle America; money was what drew Syrians to America in the first place, and money is
what they sent back to their families.”61 After the First World War, Woodrow Wilson’s
“Fourteen Point’s was ardently embraced and celebrated in the Arab world in spite of the
fact that he is not likely to have meant it as a support for the self-determination of all
peoples. It was not until America “betrayed” the principle of Arab self-determination
during its endorsement of the establishment of the state of Israel, or the nakba, that the
Arab encounter with the United States took a sharply different turn.
Another recent study by Alia Abu-Reesh focused on representations of the United
States found in six contemporary Arabic novels. The images of America found across
these novels range from positive to negative, the majority of which being predominantly
negative. America and Americans are shown as materialistic and worshippers of money
who turn away from spiritual values.
The consumer society is interested only in consumption, ever more consumption.
Everything becomes a commodity which eventually loses its value and is thrown
onto the garbage heap, even people; they, too are treated as a commodity whose
value is determined by market forces, and poses no intrinsic value of their own.62
In contrast to this representation, the ‘self’ or the ‘Arabs’ are spiritual and appalled with
such culture. Other representations of the US include America as racist towards blacks
and therefore hypocritical with respect to its foundational values. Americans are also
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portrayed as naïve and uninterested in the rest of the world. Abu-Reesh goes on to
suggest that many of the Arab characters in these books, in contrast to Americans, are
over-represented with positive values and go on to achieve greater success than their
American counterparts. She suggests that this representation is indicative of an
underlying defensive motive to prove that ‘Arabs’ are indeed worthy and equal to
Americans.
As previously mentioned, questions about and the struggle over Arab identity,
cultural critique, cultural malaise, have been a preoccupation within Arab thought for two
centuries. Since the colonial era and particularly afterward, the struggle for a sense of
‘self’ has been acute. This search for the Arab ‘self’ takes place in the dominating
shadow of the ‘West,’ whether it is that to be emulated, blamed, ignored, defeated, or a
mixture of all of these. A few of the difficult questions often raised in light of a colonial
past include
How is one to regain dignity and pride without falling into self-glorification? How
is one to recover from self-hatred and overcome despair? What does it mean to
have a culture of one’s own and a thought of one’s own? What is the link between
having an identity of one’s own and having a philosophy of one’s own? How does
one establish such an identity or philosophy? What are the pitfalls and temptations
of cultural authenticity and cultural essentialism? How does one reappropriate
one’s own history after it has been told and made by others?63
The 1967 war with Israel was a critical turning point for Arab thought and a
catalyst for an increase in two major trends: a radicalization of critique and totalizing
doctrines within Islamism.64 Salafist trends focus on tradition and look to explain the
current state of inferiority or falling behind as caused by a neglect of the tenets and values
associated with an idealized, and timeless Islamic golden age. Their perspective also
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utilizes the same colonial binary and concept of hardened civilizational categories
(‘West’ and ‘Islam’) as the famous “Clash of the Civilizations” hypothesis. The binary
attributes are simply reversed. Islam, of course, is given positive connotations and the
‘West’ the negative.
Those on the side of radical critique, such as Sadiq al-Azm, feel that the Arabs did
not engage in self-criticism and reflection after the 1967 defeat, solely blamed external
factors, and attempted to mentally evade responsibility for the outcome. He suggests that
the Arabs wanted to think that they had no control over the disaster whatsoever, similar to
natural phenomenon or the will of God. According to al-Azm, this tendency is
detrimental because self-critique is a core component of modernity and vital for
achieving liberation and agency. He believes that Arabs need to embrace the material and
historical circumstances of their situation and change from mythical-metaphysical
thinking to rational-material thinking. Therefore, he and those with similar perspectives
(such as Abdullah Laroui in his Mafhum al ‘Aql65) also operate from a binary that divides
‘tradition’ from ‘modernity,’ ‘spirit’ from ‘materialism,’ ‘science’ from ‘religion,’ etc.66
Each of these sides has continued to engage with each other, resulting in large
bodies of both secular and Islamic critique. Other scholars and writers such as Abdelkebir
Khatibi engaged with the problem from an anti-essentialist perspective. These
intellectuals “reject ideological discourses of identity and situate both heritage and even
modernity within a position of différance, where both tradition and philosophy become
objects of critique and subversion.” 67 They call for the utilization of dialectic that moves
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away from hardened oppositionality. However, these intellectuals form a minority
perspective and have a small footprint in the history of Arab thought.
Michaelle Browers’s Democracy and Civil Society in Arab Political Thought
challenges Arab exceptionalism or the claim that Arabs are overly resistant and generally
ill suited to the liberal concepts of ‘democracy’ and ‘civil society.’ She analyzes
‘concepts’ not as hardened constants but as contextual and subject for political struggle.
She looks underneath the generally authoritarian circumstances of the region to
investigate how the concepts such as ‘civil society’ and ‘democracy,’ are translated into
discourse, particularly in regards to intellectuals. She approaches the translation of
concepts in a similar fashion to the translation of texts. In translations, which are
interpretations, a concept goes through a “border crossing” and may somehow become
blurred, misunderstood, or otherwise transformed. Rather than always considering what
something loses in translation, it is worthwhile to investigate what something might gain
from its new, ‘hybrid,’ status.
Browers contests the conclusion, usually made in arguments targeting causes of
Arab exceptionalism, that the concepts of ‘civil society’ and ‘democracy’ are somehow
incompatible with Arab and Islamic thought. She demonstrates that although there still
exists a democracy deficit in the region, there is also a shared and ongoing political
discourse about these concepts. Furthermore, the frequently discussed polarization
between the Islamists and the liberals overlooks the fact that underlying these two parties
are a shared consensus on some aspects of ‘democracy,’ ‘civil society,’ and ‘citizenship.’
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In many cases these concepts have taken on the previously discussed ‘hybrid’ definitions
such as an ‘Islamic’ concept of civil society.68
Her following work, Political Ideology in the Arab World

69

, Browers examines

the concept that Arab nationalists and Islamists are becoming closer in their values (such
as Islamic liberals). She finds that instead of values merging, both groups have started to
operate significantly from the same rhetorical framework: that of Western liberalism.
Core concepts in both groups stem from liberal ideas like democracy and human rights.
According to Browers, the recently observed “alliances” between nationalists and
Islamists in rhetoric may be based more in pragmatics due to current political
circumstances. Furthermore, liberal rhetoric does not automatically lead to liberal thought
and practice.
Finally and most similar to the work in this thesis, Sami Baroudi’s article “Arab
Intellectuals and the Bush Administration’s Campaign for Democracy: The Case of the
GMEI” is a study of the reactions of Arab intellectuals in op-eds to President Bush’s
Greater Middle East Initiative in 2004. Baroudi finds that the majority of the reactions are
negative and hostile towards the United States. He categorizes the representations of the
United States into four major themes: 1) The US does not have the moral high ground to
lecture the world about democracy due to the failures of its own domestic system and
actions in world politics; 2) US policy is guided only by its own interests and not by
ideals; 3) US discourse on democracy is a conscious and malevolent plan for furthering
its own hegemony; 4) US policy makers have no understanding of the Arab or Islamic
worlds. Baroudi notes that these images are the result of the American policies in the
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region for decades and the experiences of the Arab intellectuals during their formative
years, particularly the humiliation during the 1967 war. He also suggests that these
intellectuals have little understanding of American domestic politics and that
opportunities should be created for Arabs to better learn about the United States in order
to have a more “realistic” conceptualization of it.70
!

The background to Arab encounter of the ‘West,’ informed some of the working

assumptions and analyses in this research. It is understood that the discourses in the
analyzed material are likely to be partial or entire continuations of the themes previously
discussed. Likewise, some of the observations made about the consequences of such
representations are also potentially relevant. For example, some of the underlying
framework for ‘western liberalism,’ like ‘democracy’ as an inherently positive and
universal truth (which is also part of US discourse), has frequently been incorporated in
both Islamist, leftist, and liberal discourse. Additionally, representations of America as
racist, hypocritical, or genuinely evil have a history extending well beyond the scope of
this research. However, understanding this background also makes it easier to identify
themes and representations that are potentially new and have different implications for
enabling or constraining action.
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CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS OF EGYPTIAN DISCOURSE DURING OBAMA’S SPEECH IN
CAIRO
On June 4th 2009 at Cairo University, the newly elected President Barack Obama
gave a much-anticipated speech directed towards reconciling America’s relations with the
Islamic and/or Arab worlds, which had deteriorated over the course of the previous eight
years throughout America’s “War on Terrorism” in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other areas.
The speech was an anticipated event; therefore, the date range for the articles analyzed
during the speech includes the week prior and the week after the speech (28 May-11
June). Out of all the events analyzed in this thesis, Obama’s speech in Cairo is the event
that generated the most discourse about the United States and how it is paired with
representations of the ‘self,’ be they ‘Egypt,’ ‘Arab,’ or otherwise. It is also unique from
the following chapters because it also includes articles that directly contest Obama’s
discourse (the actual words in his speech) and multiple strands of American discourse,
both liberal and realist. A total of 105 articles were analyzed from the three newspapers:
12 from al-Ahram Weekly, 61 from al-Masry al-Youm, and 32 from al-Dostor. Unlike the
other chapters in this thesis, almost all op-eds from the chosen time frame addressed the
specific event, America, etc., which signifies the speech’s perceived importance within
Egypt. The articles addressing Obama’s speech and visit comprise two-thirds of the
articles analyzed in this thesis, making this chapter significantly longer than the following
two chapters.
This chapter and the two that follow are structured in similar fashions. The first
section covers the major themes and representations of ‘America’ and how these
representations are located and interact with those of ‘Egypt.’ This section also includes
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an analysis of discursive struggles over various representations and meanings, whether
these struggles occur with Obama’s and/or America’s text or with other Egyptian
discourses. The concluding section builds on the discussed themes and assesses the
deeper archaeological assumptions behind these representations and the struggles over
meaning.

A. Major Themes and Representations
The majority of these op-eds represented President Obama’s visit to Cairo as a
significant event. The significance of the event was generated not only because of Obama
himself or the potential for what he would (or would not) say, but also because Egypt was
the chosen location for the speech, thus accentuating the perceived importance of Egypt
from the American perspective. The circumstances surrounding the speech itself were
represented as “unprecedented.” As Abdel Moneim Said wrote,
It has generally been the custom for world leaders—US presidents above all—to
address the world from the podium of the United Nations on the occasion of the
annual commencement of the General Assembly in September. That an American
president has decided to address a specific region of the world, the Islamic world,
from an Arab capital, Cairo, is new in form and substance.71
The amount of discussion about Obama’s visit was not lost on the authors themselves and
many were sarcastic about the amount of interest and the obsession with Obama himself.
More than one article was titled “Obama Mania72” and others carried titles such as
“Sheikh Obama73,” or “The American Messiah74” or “The Mawlid of our Liege,
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Obama75.” Other authors, such as Suliman Guda76, remark that the visit is regarded as
important to Egyptians but is generally irrelevant to the majority of Americans. Though
the majority of the selected articles portray a generally negative representation of
‘America’ and its past in the Arab and/or Islamic world, most of the discourses also
display a hope and a belief, even if small and pessimistic, that Obama’s visit and speech
have the potential to be the beginning of the underlying principle in Obama’s campaign
agenda: change. There are, however, exceptions to this theme, which represent Obama
and his visit as heralding more of the same American policies and biases in the region.
Over all, even if the representations are negative or there are cases that suggest the speech
means nothing, the amount of discourse itself is an indicator of the significance of
Obama’s speech and visit to many Egyptians. The remainder of this section focuses on
specific themes identified within the articles:

The Plurality of the United States
In almost all articles, both Arabic and English, the ‘United States’ or ‘America’ is
represented as a distinct side that is contrasted with an ‘Arab’ and/or ‘Islamic’ world. In
this representation of dual worlds or entities, the ‘United States’ is never limited by a
specific racial or religious identity, only by its status as a nation-state (where it is often
juxtaposed in binary with an entire ‘world’ such as the ‘Islamic world’). ‘America,’ even
restricted as a nation-state, is represented as a multifaceted and dynamic society that is
neither inherently Christian nor composed of a specific race. For example, in occasions
that the discourse mentions the American Christian right, it is represented as one of many
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currents in this dynamic and changing ‘United States,’ just as Obama himself is the very
personification of ‘change.’ Furthermore, President Obama’s ethnic background is a
matter of high interest and there exist very few texts that do not mention him as the
“black president” on at least one occasion.
Obama is the “black president” who is represented as having origins in the “third
world.”77 His presidency is represented as a victory over the obstacle of racism that is
portrayed as inherent to ‘America.’ Essam el-Erian’s article captures this sentiment:
“Definitely, he is a different president and was able through his personal efforts to
overcome the obstacles to arrive in the White House, and produce a new history of
America the racist that does not have mercy on the weak and loves power in all things.”78
Furthermore, because Obama has both “third world” and “Muslim” roots, he is “closer”
to the Arabs than his predecessors, implying a linear or even hierarchical ordering of race
and/or ethnicity. Osama Atwan mentions that Egyptians feel as though they could invite
Obama for a plate of koshary or a cup of tea.79 In other words, Obama has the ability to
have closer “access” to the Arab and Muslim world on account of his origins, whereas the
counter-situation is not implied. The Arabs and/or Muslims do not somehow have greater
access to America. Furthermore, Obama’s ethnicity does not appear in any text as a
reason that Arab-American relations might see better days.
Obama is represented as a symbol of the victory of the American ‘melting-pot,’
seen as part of America’s dynamic and flexible identity, which is also paired with its
power. Wael Abdel Fatah writes that although the United States is a failing empire,
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America is characterized by its ability to absorb blows and get new ideas from its
stores, announcing the end of racism by electing the first black president, who is
not only a symbol of victory for those of African origin but also of a hybrid and
mixed culture. Indeed he is a mixture of black and white, Muslim and Christian,
African immigrants and Europeans.80
This representation of ‘America’ as a diverse melting pot is almost an exact replica of
American discourse about itself and why it is perceived as “exceptional.”81 ‘America’
becomes an identity that encompasses everything, including all races and religions.
Though the world may be divided into ethnicities, races, and cultures, ‘America’ has the
ability to supersede and reflect all of them, making it somehow “superior” and the others
limited and weaker. It then has the authority to speak to and ‘know’ all cultures, races,
and ethnicities as it includes them all.
Unlike the ‘United States’ in these discourses, the ‘Arab’ and/or ‘Islamic’ worlds
are restricted by definition to an ethnicity, religion, or ancient civilization, though this
includes multiple nation-states. As previously mentioned, the ‘United States’ is rarely
signified as inherently Christian or representative of a specific ethnicity, although racism
towards African Americans is mentioned. In this arrangement of meanings, the US is
flexible and dynamic and the Arab/Muslim world, even though it is comprised of
multiple modern states, is homogenous and static. Wael Abdel Fatah writes,
Because the Arab people are stiff like their rulers, a quick answer to Obama’s
shifts will not come…the rulers became animated blood or frozen in the picture of
the dilapidated Ottoman rulers that sit in their palace, a symbol of an aged
power.82
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This representation is in many ways reminiscent of orientalist discourse about the
stagnant and unchanging Middle East. Unlike the young and flexible America that can
rejuvenate itself, the Arab world is literally frozen and ancient. It has no wellspring from
which change and rejuvenation can emerge.
The nation-state vs. civilization (religious or ethnic) arrangement is also likely
influenced by the fact that Obama’s speech was explicitly directed to the Islamic world,
and his original text (in this particular dialogue) produced an ‘Islamic audience’ in its
calling83. As a result, many of these articles are responses as the Muslim (and often Arab)
audience that was initially established during the announcement of the speech and, for
this event, initiated the representation of a plural ‘United States’ contrasted to a ‘Muslim’
or ‘Arab’ world that is subsequently represented as restricted. These articles, both before
and after the speech, are responses and not necessarily initiators of this segment of
discourse. Through Obama’s speech they were pre-defined as an ‘Arab’ or ‘Muslim’
audience. Furthermore, the discourses in the articles discuss grievances as ‘Muslims,’ and
less frequently as ‘Arabs.’ These grievances extend to fellow Muslims in Palestine, Iraq,
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other locations. The foundation that bonds these peoples and
their grievances are the fact that they have a ‘Muslim’ identity. Other representations of
multiple religions and identities, or of the general plurality of the region, are not found in
the majority of the texts.
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There are, however, variations to this trend of representation. For example,
Osama Ghazali Harb84 writes a letter to Obama specifically answering as an Egyptian, a
member of the political opposition, and not as an Arab and/or Muslim. Moreover, this
text is a speech to Obama (not vice versa). Ghazali Harb states that ‘Egypt’ is the first
recipient of Obama’s speech and not the ‘Arab’ and/or ‘Muslim’ worlds. In his address,
he explicitly sets up a binary between the ‘United States’ and ‘Egypt’ and goes as far as
saying that they are complete opposites. ‘Egypt’ is one of the oldest political entities
while the ‘United States’ is one of the most modern. The ‘United States’ is decentralized,
and “exploding in local and individual power,” while ‘Egypt’ is highly centralized and
full of obstacles to creativity and uniqueness. Ghazali Harb goes further, stating that
‘Egypt’ has been a highly centralized political system since the time of the pharaohs. Yet,
speaking as a member of the opposition, he also does not insinuate that there is no
resistance or plurality within ‘Egypt.’ Furthermore, though ‘Egypt’ and the ‘United
States’ are complete opposites, they are in need of each other. The United States is
inspired by Egypt’s historical wisdom and Egypt is inspired by America’s creativity and
“holiness of freedom.”85 Though generally negative in its representation of Egypt, this
binary of stark opposites is not inherently oppositional or conflictive in nature.
Furthermore, this text is one of the few occasions that the authoritarian conditions of
Egypt are specifically addressed and placed at forefront of concern (as opposed to
focusing only on Palestine and/or America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan). Moreover,
Ghazali Harb writes as a member of political opposition, transcending what is often
represented as the usual established channels of how inter-state ‘relations’ are carried out.
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However, it remains a representation of solid and defined oppositional categories, leaving
little space for transcendence.

Democratic, Hypocritical America
America, even in the most critical of these texts, is still represented as a
democratic and free state (internally) whose elections are meaningful, thus ascribing
meaning to Obama’s incumbency. Although it may practice a double standard abroad,
American citizens do not have their freedom violated and live in desirable circumstances.
With occasional rare exceptions, this same democratic America is often described as
hypocritical abroad when it comes to its own norms and values; or what America is
supposed to “stand for.” However, there is almost unilateral agreement of what
America’s values are “supposed” to be (usually lining up with American discourse about
itself) and that these values are inherently positive and even universal: democracy, human
rights, freedom, etc. None of these terms are contested in these texts, and are given a
positive and desirable connotation. They are often used to show how the United States is
violating its true identity and values by engaging in wars in Iraq, Afghanistan,
maintaining Guantanamo, and the incidents of torture at Abu Gharib. Therefore, in these
representations, the US is regarded as contradicting its own dominant discourse. As
Ezzedine Fishere writes, “We blame America not for its values but for violating them
when it comes to dealing with us. A fresh start is therefore possible, if your
administration upholds the values you committed yourself to.”86 Therefore, this
representation of America, in agreement with what constitutes as American values, is
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used as a tool to critique America’s foreign policy, which is generally regarded as a
function of rational pursuit of objective strategic interests.

America, Pursuer of Interests
American hypocrisy abroad in generally represented as resulting from America’s
pursuit of “rational” strategic interests. In these representations, it is assumed that the
United States has objective and unquestionable strategic interests in the Middle East or
Arab world, be they Israel’s security, oil, or general world hegemony. In other words, the
Middle East and/or Arab world is a central and undeniably important world region,
particularly to America. According to the texts, though Obama’s speech may be about
reconciliation and suggest that America’s ideals and interests do not need to be mutually
exclusive, his speech is still only about pursuing these same ‘interests.’ However, his
tools to obtain them are diplomacy and soft power as opposed to his predecessor’s use of
force and preventative wars.
In this representation, Obama’s message has very little to do with achieving the
region’s interests and is only about the welfare of the United States. There is often a
distinction drawn between actions and words. Though America’s discourse might revolve
around human rights, freedom, etc., it actually behaves otherwise. As Ayman el-Amir
states, “The Muslims who Barack Obama intends to address on 4 June cannot help but
see that Washington is speaking from both sides of its mouth when it comes to Arab and
Muslim concerns.”87 Sahar Gamaara also writes,
[B]arack that heads the council of world management, does not have to force the
world to give up the policy of double standards, and will not provide a “free” gift
to the Arabs who bowed to the occupation of Iraq. Indeed, he works to cool the
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volatile region around the Zionist entity, achieving the American strategic
interests first, and insurance of the “pampered” Hebrew nation with its nuclear
fortifications.88
Although America is represented as having strategic interests, these interests are never
fully explained or expanded upon. They are stated as an unquestionable truth. These
interests range from being based in support of the “Zionist entity” to being a result of a
general ideology against Islam or Arabs. Moreover, no one contests the idea that
America’s interests are fixed or objective, or defined by perception and/or subject to
political struggle. They are irrefutable, suggesting that there exists no possibility or
strategy attached to trying to change America’s interests.
Furthermore, representing America as only pursuing strategic interests in its
foreign policy also challenges the relevance of Obama entering the presidency. In other
words, there is no difference between Bush, Obama, or any other individual who enters
the White House because this change does not affect America’s strategic interests.
Mokhtar Nouh captures this idea well when he writes, “The important thing sir, is that the
age of Obama will pass, and after him will come the age of ‘Sokohama,’ and then return
to the age of the grandson of the grandson of Bush and then the seventh son of Clinton,
and nothing new will happen…”89 This theme is rooted in basic realpolitik. The break
between what America does domestically, including its supposed diversity, and what it
does abroad is rationalized or naturalized by the construction of inherent strategic
interests. America’s foreign policy, though not “nice,” is represented as rational because
it is founded in pursuing unchangeable truths. Multiple texts include remarks such as,
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“there are no miracles in politics90,” or that “interests and not relations are the basis of
politics now.”91 This representation accepts pursuit of these interests as justifiable in that
they are rational. It is also a replica of American realpolitik discourse that justifies actions
abroad through the same rationale.

The Sick, Yet Powerful Empire
The US as an occupying world empire is a prevalent representation across the
texts. However, when the ‘United States’ is portrayed as a world empire, it is usually in
conjunction with being a failing and sick power that is still reeling from the past eight
years of President George W. Bush. In this theme, the largest blows to the American
empire are its financial crisis and the loss of face that America has experienced not just in
the Islamic world but also across the globe. In many texts, Obama’s election is
represented as tied to this situation in that he is presumed to embody the American
peoples’ new hope to change America’s internal direction and to correct its image in the
world. As Hassan Nafaa writes, “America is not just going through a foreign policy
crisis, but also an existential one, so to speak. It is the multifaceted ailment of America
that brought Obama to power, and he knows that.”92 Therefore, though Obama may have
the ability to woo his audience and convince Egyptians that he is present on their behalf,
in actuality Obama’s speech and behavior is again about America’s interests and
repairing its empire. He was elected by the American public in order to solve America’s
national problems, particularly its financial crisis, and not those of any other nation. As,
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Mosbah Qutb mentions, Obama’s real desire in delivering the speech in Cairo is to ensure
that America remains the world’s top economic power.93
Although America is a “failing empire,” it is still represented as being the world’s
only superpower, and Obama is referred to more than once as the emperor or ruler of the
world. America may be a wounded tiger, but it is still a tiger in the end. Mahmoud
‘Imara94 mentions that many people hope for America’s decline as a result the current
financial crisis or China’s inevitable rise. He then proceeds to argue against the tenability
of this wish through listing ‘data’ as unquestionable indictors (such as number of top
universities, average median income, and national budget in comparison to China) that
America will not lose its place as the world’s single superpower anytime soon. Following
his representation of America’s abundance and power, he contrasts this to the Arab
world. He asks his readers to be honest in looking for the answer to the Arab situation
and then states that it comes from addiction to rumors and conspiracy theories. Echoing
the most blatant examples of classic orientalist thought, he mentions that Arabs produce
thoughts from the Middle Ages and will, if they reject Obama’s outstretched hand, miss
the train of civilization and urbanization.95 Therefore, ‘America’ even in a weakened state
still retains regenerative and flexible properties that will keep it on top. In opposition to
this, the Arabs are represented as stagnant and stuck in the Middle Ages, and in danger of
the ‘world’ turning its back on them and being left behind. Furthermore, the world is
constructed as a linear path to modernization where America (and the rest of the world)
has left the Arabs behind.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
93

Qutb, Mosbah, “al-Sabi‘ awalan,” al-Masry al-Youm, 10 June 2009.
‘Imara, Mahmoud, “bil-‘Arqam, a‘rif Amrika,” al-Masry al-Youm, 8 June 2009.
95
Ibid.
94

!

49!

America, Supporter or Hostage of Zionism
The most repeated representation of America in the discourse about Obama’s
speech is America’s relationship with Israel and the Arab-Israel conflict as a whole,
particularly in regards to Palestine. In this theme, the keys to change in the Arab world,
and a symbol of its stagnation and humiliation, revolve around the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict. Any reconciliation between America and the Islamic world, or even change
itself, can only be achieved through placing the Palestinian crisis at the top of the agenda.
El Kersh writes,
It is precisely this that makes us, time and again, eager to point out that no change
will arrive in the Muslim world except through the gateways of an Arab
Jerusalem, after the Palestinian rights are retrieved and a Palestinian state is
established, and through adequately addressing the long register of grievances of
Iraq, Sudan and Afghanistan.96
America is represented as a friend of Israel and/or controlled by a “Zionist entity” who
then has the ability to continue afflicting atrocities on the Palestinian people who also
represent the injustices afflicted on the Arab world as whole. Some of these
representations range from seeing space between ‘America’ and ‘Zionism’ while others
regard them as essentially one and the same thing. One author writes that,
Our strategic analysts talk with nihilistic logic about the lack of difference
between Bush and Obama, and all who arrive to the White House, to consider
them merely tools or décor that can only implement a hidden agenda to the benefit
of world Zionism…97
Through focusing almost exclusively on Palestine, the author’s gaze is shifted away from
any of America’s complicity in Egypt’s internal domestic problems and critique of its
behavior is placed in an external location. Some representations go as far as reducing all
of Obama’s speech as entirely directed towards the Israeli ambassador and journalist who
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were also present at Cairo University (for reassuring the depth of the US-Israeli strategic
relationship).98 The speech then has nothing to do with the ‘Arabs,’ or ‘Muslims’ but only
to do with ‘Israel.’ They are represented as invisible or irrelevant even in the event where
they are theoretically the key audience.
Perhaps of more interest, the Palestinian issue (in addition to Iraq and
Afghanistan) is almost always represented as solvable by the United States and not by
another entity (including the Arab world), whether this entails Obama cutting the
relationship with Israel or being able to thwart the powers of the Israeli lobby on
Congress. Focusing on Palestine as the embodiment of Arab grievances leaves many
other issues unspoken, namely the US support for Egypt’s authoritarian regime and
perhaps the grievances that are more likely to directly affect the livelihood of Egyptians.
However, as previously stated, because Obama is giving his address to the ‘Muslim
world,’ even if he is speaking from Cairo, much of the responding discourses revolve
around speaking in a voice as the Muslim world and not always as Egyptians.

America, the Irrelevant
A more rare but interesting theme is the representation of ‘America’ as irrelevant
and powerless in affecting any change in the Arab or Muslim world. Usually discourses
that carry this representation have a mocking or sarcastic tone towards Obama’s visit to
Cairo and the excitement that has been generated in Egyptian society. In “Obama is
Coming!” Bothaina Kamel99 facetiously tells the Egyptians to “jump for joy” (like
children) because Obama comes bearing toys, milk, and honey and will solve all
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problems. However, she goes on to conclude that though Obama may represent change,
he will not be able to do anything for Egyptians unless Egyptians decide to change
themselves.100 Another satire piece by Ghada Sherif represents Obama’s visit as not
having political significance but because she asked him to marry her. She then
humorously discusses how all of the plans revolving around Obama’s speech were
actually wedding arrangements and details. She concludes hoping that the wedding will
not be destroyed by all the people who think that Obama’s visit to Cairo is about politics
because, ultimately, the visit is about romance. In other words, Obama’s visit is
politically irrelevant.101 Representing Obama or ‘America’ as unable to be an agent for
change implies that the true catalysts for changing regional or Egyptian circumstances
lies with the people of the area themselves. Therefore, action and the outcome of the
region’s future are placed in the hands of the Egyptians, and/or Arabs.

Obama, the Magician
One of the predominant themes in the texts is that the ‘America,’ represented and
personified as Obama and/or his administration, is entirely rational, unified, and
calculating. Obama’s skills, particularly in speech and rhetoric, are intended to woo the
Egyptian audience and are part of a calculation that is often represented as conniving,
duplicitous or even as a gift of “poisoned honey” to the Egyptians. In more than one
article, Obama is referred to as a magician or likened to the conductor of a symphony
who is able to drug his audience with his melodies102. In fact, Amr Abdel Hamid
dedicated an entire article to disproving (through discussing teleprompters) what it
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mentioned as a prevalent myth that Obama had improvised or memorized his entire
speech, much to the amazement of the majority of Egyptians.103
Ultimately, Obama may say the same things as his predecessor and seek only to
enhance US interests, but somehow his magic dupes the audience. In these same articles
the audience, and Egyptian society as a whole, is represented as responding emotionally
and even irrationally to Obama’s skillful rhetoric and charisma. Many authors were
dismayed or confused104 by the extent of clapping that Obama received throughout his
speech, particularly when he recited verses from the Qur’an or mentioned the
accomplishments of Islamic civilization. This emotional characteristic is described as a
point of weakness that is inherent to Egyptians.105 In this discourse, the ‘Egyptian mind’
is represented as inherently emotional, and even given feminine attributes that are
arranged to imply a negative connotation. Perhaps the most direct and critical author
within this particular theme is Ibrahim ‘Eissa, who describes his disgust with the
audience response as ‘humiliation,’ ‘shame,’ and ‘embarrassment.’106 ‘Eissa likens the
general reaction to Obama’s speech to the behavior of housewives107 and even
prostitutes108 who are seduced by flattery. He goes on to mock Egypt’s “mustached” or
“manly” society that actually behaves in a manner similar to that of a young woman who
is overcome by emotion and shouts her love to a famous celebrity on a stage.109
In these representations, it is Obama who is represented as the main actor or the
initiator. He is the giver of a speech, a wooer, a deceiver, a magician, and nothing less
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than the ruler of an “empire.” The Egyptian audience is portrayed as the reactor or the
passive entity that is under Obama’s influence and skill. Obama is represented as in the
position of power, even though he is also coming to make amends and heal rifts between
the American and the Islamic world. His position of power is contrasted to that of an
inherent Egyptian weakness, reflective in irrational emotion and susceptibility to flattery
that ultimately signifies a deep hurt, insecurity, and a longing for a past greatness.
Furthermore, Obama is in a position to ‘know’ Egyptians or the ‘Islamic world’ to the
extent that he can use it, such as quoting the Qur’an, to exploit emotions and gain the
advantage. Though the Egyptians may also “know” Obama, his background, and his
country or culture, this fact still does not allow them to be in a position of power or use
this information to their advantage. The Egyptians are the passive audience whose
“actions are always reactions” according to Ashraf al-Husiny. “I mean, why do we want
others who are not us to lead on behalf of us... Or, are we addicted to watching and
observing?”110
Although the audience in Cairo University and Egyptian society as a whole are
represented as bedazzled by Obama’s speech and rhetoric, none of the authors’ voices
themselves suggest that they themselves are under the same spell. The negative portrayals
of the Egyptian audience function more as self-critique and analysis rather than simply
pure emotional disgust or humiliation. After describing Obama’s brilliance and the
audience reaction, the authors express their dismay through stating that, in actuality,
Obama said very little that differed from the statements of his predecessor. In other
words, they unravel his speech and pair it with other themes such as rational pursuit of
US interests or, more often than not, deeply rooted in a Pro-Israeli or Zionist agenda.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110

!

al-Husiny, Ashraf, “al-Hakim Basha, Obama,” al-Masry al-Youm, 1 June 2009.

54!

Therefore, the articles suggest that the authors ‘know’ and are showing the ‘truth’ behind
the circumstances of the speech and that ultimately, neither they nor necessarily
Egyptians as a whole are duped by false charms and empty words.

Controlling Obama’s Gaze
Running in a different direction than the theme that places Obama in the position
of “performer,” this representation reverses the scenario. This theme takes on literal and
deeper meanings in regards to Obama or ‘America’ as the actor who is “seeing” and may
not see everything. Controlling what Obama literally “sees” or the meaning he ascribes to
what he sees is described as struggled over by various entities, particularly the ruling
regime. Belal Fadl asks what would happen if Obama were to suddenly deviate from the
pre-planned route to Cairo University and see the poorer areas of Cairo. He sarcastically
remarks that should Obama decide to do so, the regime would react by telling him that
the slums around Cairo University were a giant laboratory experiment for the students or
that Zahi Hawass would tell him that the poor sewage conditions were actually the first
open air museum of ancient Egyptian bathrooms.111 In this representation, as in his article
the day before, Fadl suggests that the Egyptian regime has the ability to impact Obama
and swindle him about the true conditions of Egypt. Fadl jokes that should Obama return
to the White House and begin drafting amendments that allow him to remain president
for life, then it would be confirmed that the “wise leaders” of Egypt had in fact impacted
Obama during his visit.112

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
111
112

!

Fadl, Belal, "Istibaha," al-Masry al-Youm, 3 June 2009.
Fadl, Belal, "Istibaha," al-Masry al-Youm, 2 June 2009.

55!

Ayman Nour’s article, “The Egypt that Barack Obama will Not See,” carries the
same theme, although images of America are almost non-existent in his article. In his
text, Obama is represented as passing observer who will never see the “real Egypt” and is
a catalyst to reflect on Egypt’s corruption, poverty, and authoritarianism. He wonders
why Egypt must choose between “backwardness” and “extremism.113” Other articles,
written by Ibrahim Mansour, discuss how Obama’s visit impacted regular Egyptians,
particularly those near the official route that Obama would take. He described how
citizens were told it was a day off from work and blocked from entering and leaving their
houses so that Cairo would be free of traffic and its citizens. Furthermore, he sarcastically
thanks Obama for coming to Cairo because it forced the regime to remember its
responsibility in cleaning the streets and clarified how much the regime treats its citizens
with contempt. He asks whether American citizens would be treated the same way should
the situation be opposite and Mubarak visited the United States.114
In this representation, it is important to control or enact a performance for Obama
and/or America. In most cases, the Egyptian regime is represented as winning the rights
to control this performance and marginalize its own people in the process. In fact,
Ibrahim ‘Eissa writes of his intention to boycott Obama’s speech partially for this reason;
participating in the speech makes one guilty of colluding with the regime to present the
“right” picture to Obama.115 Controlling the content of this performance is represented as
a struggle over power and intertwines with the idea that the ‘West’ or ‘America’ has the
authority and power to ‘see,’ ‘know,’ and ‘judge’ Egyptians and their circumstances. The
outcome of this gaze and the impression that ‘America’ has of ‘Egypt’ results in political
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and material implications. Therefore ‘America,’ represented in a position of power, is an
entity to be performed for and convinced that your performance is the ‘true Egypt’ that
Obama or America will know and direct its actions towards. This representation is also
related to the struggle to affect representations in the dominant discourse that emanate
from America and is discussed later in the next section.

America, Seeker of Moderate Islam
This theme falls under the previous theme of “performing” for ‘America’ and
controlling what Obama or America “sees” and the meaning ascribed. ‘America’ is
represented as still reeling from the attacks of September 11th and ambivalent in its
relationship with Islam as a whole. However, America, particularly since Obama’s
presidency, is trying to repair its relations with ‘Islam’ and assert that ‘America’ is not at
war with ‘Islam’ and that ‘Islam’ is not synonymous with ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism.’ In
parallel with this new policy, ‘America’ is searching for “moderate Islam” in order to
combat “extremism” or degenerations of ‘Islam’ that produce terrorism. Or, as Obama
said in his speech, “Islam is not part of the problem in combating violent extremism – it
is an important part of promoting peace.”116 !
Since ‘America’ is attempting to make amends with the ‘Islamic world’ and build
bridges, many texts mention that it is the voices of “moderate Islam” who need to heal
the rift. Abdel Moneim Said writes, “Yet what Obama is probably really interested in
hearing is the message from the moderate Arab countries, which frequently know how to
express what the US and its allies want.”117 Ensuring that ‘America’ qualifies you with
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the tag of “moderate” means that you will find yourself in its good graces. Osama Heikal
suggests that Obama chose to give his speech from Egypt not just because it is the “heart
of the Islamic world” but also because it is “moderate” and fights terrorists.118 Sheikh Ali
Gomaa of Al Azhar writes a letter to Obama that is another strong example of this same
type of discourse: !
It is important to stress that Islam is capable of existing in all ages and building
bridges with all civilisations, a fact that has been substantiated by history and
confirmed by Islamic sources of authority at all levels. This obliges dialogue with
voices of Islamic moderation, which should be used as a frame of reference for
the advancement of mutual understanding between the Islamic and Western
worlds, so as to usher in a brighter future and pave the way for equitable
cooperation in which both the Islamic world and the US can attain their interests
in a continually just manner in which no party transforms itself into an executive
instrument for actions that ultimately conflict with their own interests.119
Therefore, much of the discourse is molded around trying to fit the American
discourse and acknowledge a separation between moderation and extremism. In the
theme, ‘Islam’ is represented as compatible with liberal values, pursuit of rational
interests, and again carries an assumption that these elements are positive and even
universal.
The theme of performing for ‘America’ and controlling its definition of ‘moderate
Islam’ is taken deeper with Dr. Rafik Habib’s article, “Message of the Regime to
America through the Brotherhood.”120 This article describes the political stakes in the
ongoing struggle to define the Muslim Brotherhood as an extremist movement, as
opposed to a moderate and reform movement with which the US administration can
work. According to Habib, the regime’s recent crackdowns on the Muslim Brotherhood
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serves multiple purposes, one of which is to signal to the United States that it will not
tolerate dealings with an “extremist” and illegal entity. According to Habib, if the United
States were to recognize the Muslim brotherhood as a legitimate, moderate, and reformist
entity, then it would be a massive societal force. Once again, ‘America’ plays the role of
judge or arbiter, or the entity that assigns the label of “moderate” or “extreme” and
subsequently empowers the winners of this performance.
Another thread in this struggle over representing “moderation” and “extremism,”
is the contestation over the definition of these terms and others such as “resistance” and
“terrorism.” As Ibrahim ‘Eissa points out, Obama’s speech discusses the necessity of
fighting terrorism but there does not exist a complete agreement on what terrorism is. He
goes on to add that when Obama states that violent resistance is not legitimate,
particularly in regards to the Palestinians, he forgets his own country’s armed resistance
during the American revolution.121 Or, as Manar al-Shorbagy asks, does America
consider Nelson Mandela to be a terrorist?122 Therefore, in this struggle, the discourse
emanating from the US is reassessed and arranged to be reflective of a double standard.
Other texts contest the origins and catalysts for extremism, generally suggesting that they
are rooted in the unresolved issue of Palestine in which America is a culprit.

Idealized America as an Unusual Tool for Critique
In some of the texts, “classic” and “idealized” representations of America are
reframed and then utilized to contest meanings in Egyptian discourse. For example,
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Husnin Krum123 suggests that Obama’s speech should have “given the Egyptian liberals a
lesson.” In this representation, ‘America’ is democratic and respective of individual
freedoms, including the freedom to practice one’s religion. Krum cites portions from
Obama’s speech where he criticizes nations in Europe and other regions for restricting
women from being able wear the higab, etc. in the name of secularism. According to
Krum, Obama and ‘America’ embody the true meaning and respect for these types of
individual freedoms. Therefore, what he represents as Egypt’s “liberals” are flawed in
their critique of the higab because they violate the tenets of true liberalism and freedom,
as embodied by America and Obama’s words. As the title of the piece sarcastically
suggests, Obama in this representation is “biased” towards those who are “banned” (or
the Islamists) and “extremists,” thus utilizing a dominant representation of ‘America’ in
an unusual pairing with Muslim rights.124

B. Underlying Assumptions
Significant portions of the previously discussed representations, and struggles
over meaning, carry the same underlying and generally unstated assumptions. In all texts,
the ‘United States’ is assumed to be rational, unified, and calculating, even when it
shown to have diversity, multiple political currents, or governmental checks and balances
(thus at times demonstrating a contradiction within the same article). Whether US
intentions are grounded in pursuit of strategic interests, true and sincere reconciliation,
part of a Zionist plot or bias, or a general bias against Islam, they are rational and
calculated. Furthermore, every word of Obama’s speech is reflective of a well-defined
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agenda, be it rooted in American foreign policy or targeting constituents back home.
What is unstated is that according to this assumption, ‘America’ does not make mistakes
even if it can be regarded as immoral or biased in its actions. This representation also
leads to the assumption that all words or actions carry a unified intent directed towards
‘Egypt’ or the Arab and Muslim world that it should, in turn, produce a corresponding
desired reaction.
Another underlying assumption is that relations between the ‘United States’ and
‘Egypt’ or the Arab and Muslims emanate from a government-to-government
relationship. While many of the texts represent ‘Egypt’ as having a split between the
regime and its population, America is ‘democratic’ and has unified voice and intention
that is propagated from the American government, specifically the US president who is
generally represented as the embodiment of ‘America.’ Other relations that transcend or
fall underneath state-to-state relations are not considered as part of the Arab-American
relationship. America interacts with Egypt and the Arab/Muslim world exclusively
through its government. As a result, any action taken by ‘Egypt’ with respect to this
relationship should be channeled through the Egyptian and US governments. Such a
representation also limits who has the capacity to interact with and engage ‘America’ or
with ‘Egypt.’
Additionally, in all cases, the ‘Muslim’ and ‘Arab’ worlds are represented as
strategically significant and relevant to the United States. As has been the case in the
past, the US is unlikely to shift its attention away from the region in the future, making it
an inevitable force to be dealt with whether it is benevolent, neutral, or hostile to Arab
interests. Therefore, America is assumed to remain pertinent and relevant to regional or
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Egyptian interests and must be considered a significant actor in the political scene. As a
result, leaving ‘America’ out of the picture seems to be an untenable course of action in
this representation. Furthermore, ‘America’ is always in the ‘Arab’ world but there is
never a representation of ‘Egypt’ in ‘America.’ The space for the Egypt-American
‘relations’ always occurs in Egypt yet ‘America’ is represented as the entity carrying out
action.
As ‘America’ is almost always considered a relevant and permanent actor, its
multiple representations can be used as tools within the texts to illustrate and argue a
variety of perspectives. ‘America’ is a tool for self- critique whether this directed towards
a stagnant, authoritarian Egypt or for highlighting a bias against Muslims. It can be used
as representing the root cause of regional turmoil and extremism or as having the agency
to solve pertinent issues. More often than not, representations of ‘America’ exist to
elaborate on regional issues and elements. Or ‘America’ exists as a tool to examine the
‘self,’ whether this is done in a hierarchical fashion or transcends oppositions and power
equations.

!

62!

CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF EGYPTIAN DISCOURSE AFTER THE DEATH OF OSAMA BIN
LADEN
!
Unlike the amount of discourse generated about the ‘United States’ during the two
weeks surrounding President Obama’s speech in Cairo, the death of Osama bin Laden
prompted significantly less discussion in the three analyzed newspapers. Because this
timeframe falls approximately three months after the Jan 25th 2011 uprising in Egypt,
many of the op-eds and their topics (not part of this research agenda) revolve exclusively
around Egypt and the Arab world and have no mention of the United States. American
forces killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan on 2 May 2011. Therefore, the range of dates
for the discourse analyzed start from 3 May and end on 16 May 2011. There were 29
articles that included substantial representations of ‘America’ during this timeframe (in
stark contrast to the 105 articles from the preceding chapter). Only 14 of these 29 articles
directly discuss Osama bin Laden’s death, indicating what appears to be minor interest in
the incident. The other 15 articles included in this chapter explicitly discuss the ‘United
States’ or ‘America’ but generally in the context of the Egyptian revolution and the Arab
Spring as a whole. As these representations still fully fit the purposes of the research
agenda, they were included in the analysis. Fifteen, or about half, of the analyzed articles
came from al-Dostor, ten from al-Masry al-Youm, and four from al-Ahram Weekly.

A. Major Themes and Representations
The themes within this analysis carry some similarity with previously discussed
topics, such as America’s pursuit of interests and support of Israel and Zionism.
However, there are also many new types of representations, which never appeared in the
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over 100 articles from the previous chapter. It is recognized that the dynamic of media
censorship, which was still fully in place during Obama’s speech, is likely to have
changed and affected the range of possible published discourse, as are the events from 25
January 2011. It is clear from all the analyzed articles that the time of “reconciliation”
and “change” with America, often presented as a possibility during the timeframe of
Obama’s speech in Cairo, is long past. In these representations, ‘America’ is not only
represented negatively, but more often than not as enemy number one for the Egyptians,
Arabs, and their interests.

America, the Vengeful
Somewhat similar and related to the representations of America as hypocritical
with regards to its own and international norms and values, is the theme that killing
Osama bin Laden was a pursuit of revenge rather than justice. Therefore, ‘America’ is
ultimately hypocritical and does not follow its own purported standards. According to
this discourse, Osama Bin Laden is an accused person and not necessarily just a
‘terrorist,’ contesting the American discourse of the ‘war on terror,’ and ‘terrorism’ in
general as being qualified as an illegitimate type of warfare that also places the labeled
‘terrorist’ outside of traditional rights. In these discourses, bin Laden deserved a trial as
any accused person deserves, and his death was an indication of America’s desire for
revenge. However, with these representations also comes the idea that America is weaker
and more vulnerable for having violated these values. ‘America,’ through its own actions
(and as a reaction to bin Laden), has unraveled its own narrative about itself.
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Ghada Karmi writes in al-Ahram Weekly that bin Laden’s death was ultimately a
summary execution where the US played judge, jury, executioner, and funeral director.
She discusses the Americans celebrating in the wake of bin Laden’s death,
For them, a man who had masterminded the attacks of 11 September 2001 -- that
came to be known simply as 9/11 -- and caused such pain and suffering had
received his just desserts. None of the revelers paused to ask whether this was a
legal action commensurate with the much-vaunted US promotion of democracy
and the rule of law. It was not…[K]illing Bin Laden might have been sweet
revenge and given a boost to Obama's re-election chances, but when the glow is
over its after-effects in terrorist retaliation will likely strike many countries,
including the US itself. Yet none of this deflected America from its obsession
with Bin Laden and its thirst for retribution.125
In other words, America violates norms of justice, generally featured in its own discourse
about itself, to assuage the wounds and sate its anger from the events of September 11th.
In this representation, ‘America’ and ‘Americans’ are more emotional than rational.
However, ‘America’ is still fully capable of pursuing its desires, even if they are rooted in
an emotional and flawed concept like revenge. Pursuing revenge may be a catalyst for
more terrorist attacks, ultimately resulting in a weaker and more vulnerable ‘America.’ In
Kharmi’s representation, the US is harming itself. However, in other representations bin
Laden is more closely attributed to causing the undoing.
Mohamed Amin126 says that it is not only Arabs who question the manner of
Osama bin Laden’s death but also the ‘Christian West.’ He states that Western critics also
consider the killing to be a “revenge operation,” and describes a moment of soul
searching occurring in what he represents as a separate civilization (the West). He uses
perspectives he states as coming from religious figures like Domenico Mogavero, the
Diocese of Mazara del Vallo who believes that “there is no justice in revenge.” In this
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representation, he implies legitimacy or authority on the part of a religious figure, casting
a religious identity to the entity he refers to as the ‘West.’ If the ‘Christian West’ also
finds the killing controversial, the manner and validity of the death has even more doubt
cast upon it. Amin goes on to add that the Arab Spring has managed to change the
perception of ‘Arabs’ in the ‘West’ and that now they are no longer shackled with being
associated with Osama bin Laden and terrorism. He suggests that the problems between
the ‘Arabs’ and ‘West’ should be overcome with ‘civilizational conversation’ and the
realization of justice, not revenge127. In his text, ‘America’ has stepped outside the
bounds and the approval of both ‘civilizations.’ It has breached the moral authority of
both and is not the powerful and unchallengeable ‘America’ often portrayed in other
texts.
Hassan Nafaa represents the manner of Osama bin Laden’s killing in a similar
perspective. In his piece, “American and bin Laden, Who Killed Who?128” the manner of
bin Laden’s death is a “stain on the forehead of America,” and a victory for bin Laden.
As a result of his actions and the manner of his death, history will treat bin Laden with
respect and regard him as having the attributes of both Che and Gandhi, with a unique
Islamic flavor. He becomes a legend while ‘America’ has weakened and defaced itself
before the world. In this representation, though ‘America’ has acted outside the bounds of
morality and/or international law, it has ultimately lost in the end, thus insinuating that
bin Laden ultimately “killed” ‘America’ or what ‘America’ is “supposed” to be. Again,
as in the previous representations of this type, ‘America’ has become less powerful and
tainted as a result of its actions though ‘American’ intentions may have been otherwise.
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Slightly different than Kharmi, ‘America’ was undone or “killed” by only a single man
who, according Hassan Nafaa, was not back by any nation or state and fought for what he
believed to the very last drop of his blood. Whether ‘America’ undoes itself or is undone
by Osama bin Laden, it is no longer invincible.

America, the Hated
‘America’ is represented not just negatively but as an extremely malevolent entity
in eleven of the texts, or approximately forty percent. Two of the texts explicitly address
‘America’ as an internationally hated entity and claim that this hatred is increasing daily.
According to Mokhtar Nouh129, the international hatred of the United States is so
powerful that he predicts America’s destruction within the next ten years. Similar to
previously discussed texts, he also sees the death of Osama bin Laden as a catalyst that
will incite more violence against America and its interests. In the end, he mourns the
death of bin Laden because he is the true “giant” who made America seem like the
“dwarf” that it is. Ali al-Sayid130 makes a similar case, stating that America, after killing
Osama bin Laden, is more threatened than any time since September 11th. His description
of America captures the extremely negative portrayal of ‘America’ in these texts and is
also tied to the previous theme addressing ‘America’s unjust vengeance:
If the greatest nation in the world does not try the accused, or act justly with a
prisoner, and honor a corpse, indeed it is the lowest of nations in the world. If
civilization and development do not reflect humanity there is no value in it, and if
there is no fair law embodying it, then it is titled as a criminal state, transformed
into a gang of unlawful killing. America is thus a nation that the law does not
limit nor is it deterred by the stream of blood, which flows in every spot where it
exists.131
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While America’s discourse represents Osama bin Laden as a terrorist and a criminal, in
this representation the signs are reversed and it is ‘America’ who is the ‘criminal state’
and the cold-blooded killer. Its civilizational progress is bankrupt because it contains no
humanity or value.
Furthermore, ‘America’ in these types of representations is completely and
entirely antithetical to Arab and Egyptian interests. The relationship is a purely
oppositional and uncontestable binary. Without giving extensive reasoning for this
representation, it is simply and unquestioningly known that ‘America’ is out to attack and
destroy Arabs. For example, Mohamed Habib writes a long article listing a variation of
domestic and internal reasons that he is worried about the fate of Egypt. However, he
ends his article with a warning about the dire threat on the horizon,
Indeed, the American administration or the European Union are not reform
institutions, nor a charity association, but the owner of a scheme aiming at the
knees of the nation, dividing its roots, dissolving its identity, corrupting its ethics,
looting its goodness, as well as eliminating its cultural specificity and obliterating
landmarks of its civilizational heritage…not to mention ensuring the interests of
the Zionist agent and guaranteeing its crushing ascendancy over all Arab
nations.132
‘America’ and the ‘West’ will do everything to pull the ‘Arab’ civilization, or the ‘self,’
apart and degrade its past. Yet while ‘America’ is a hated and nearly evil entity in many
of the texts, the majority of the time its bloodthirsty actions are represented as ultimately
leading to its destruction. Therefore, ‘America’ may be powerful but it also carries a fatal
flaw, able to be exploited by one man. In this context, ‘America’ is able to be defeated
and not likely to remain at the pinnacle of the world system indefinitely.
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CIA America
Although there were four times as many articles in the previous chapter, none of
them contained this type of representation of the ‘United States.’ Approximately onethird (10 of 29) articles contain this type of representation, all published in al-Dostor with
the exception of one from al-Masry al-Youm. Five of these articles (half) were written by
the same author: Dr. Rifaat Sayid Ahmed. This theme contains an unclear and ambiguous
‘America,’ most of the time crossing the line into what might generally be regarded as
conspiracy theory. In all the variations of this representation, the ‘United States’ is
represented as a sinister and somewhat invisible force, usually associated with the CIA or
operating through “secret projects,” and is plotting against the Arabs or Egypt as a whole.
Much of this discourse revolves around the secret American plans to “steal Egypt’s
revolution” and not the death of Osama bin Laden. The reasons behind such sinister plans
are rarely examined in detail and are haphazardly attached to America’s “rational” pursuit
of interests. This theme is the closest to representing America as an irrationally evil and
sinister “boogey man,” who hides in the closet at night. It is not a country with peoples or
an administration, but a ‘force’ or an ‘entity,’ similar to the personified ‘Zionist entity.’
Furthermore, these texts represent the general news, such as bin Laden’s death, as not
true and an illusion. ‘America’ is so powerful that it has the ability to fabricate a fake
world with fake events. In contrast to the previously discussed representations, this theme
contains an ‘America’ that is almost unstoppable. The only sure safety is to be aware and
on the look-out for devious American plans or those who throw in their lot with
‘America.’
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When Osama bin Laden’s death is discussed in these articles, it is portrayed as
fabricated or as having potentially happened at another time and as part of a larger
American production or fabrication. As Mohamed al-Shafaa asks, “Who is sure this isn’t
just a Hindi film?”133 He goes on to question the validity of the news because bin Laden’s
death achieves America’s and Obama’s interests (such as increasing re-election chances),
because there exists no film of the raid, and because bin Laden’s body was rapidly
disposed of at sea. Due to the surety that the US possesses the technological means to
prove Osama’s death, the lack of such proof means that the news is false and any
following proof is certainly fabricated.
Abdullah al-‘Ashaal134 goes as far as saying that Al Qaeda itself is an entirely
fabricated phenomenon, though he is not fully clear as to whether it is Israeli, American,
or both (he suggests all in multiple manners throughout the article). While he does not
overtly question the timing or feasibility of Osama’s death, he represents Al Qaeda as the
fabricated excuse utilized by both the United States and Israel for foreign intervention.
He also states that there existed no proof from the American September 11th
investigations that Al Qaeda actually exists or that Osama bin Laden was behind the
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. ‘Ashaal argues that Osama bin Laden
and Al Qaeda have always been bad for Arab interests because they are utilized as a
legitimizing tool for interference. Moreover, Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda do not
affect US and/or Israeli interests and are not threatening to them, contrary to how
American discourse portrays the threat of Al Qaeda. Therefore, because they are bad for
Arab interests, Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden must actually be under the control of
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‘America.’ The least “sensationalist” of the articles that suggests the fabrication of
Osama bin Laden’s death comes from al-Barghoty135 writing in Al Masry Al Youm. He
states that it is well known that Osama bin Laden died the previous April and that the
United States simply stole his body and waited for the right timing for the announcement
of his death (which ultimately centers on helping Obama’s re-election chances).
Therefore, the death of bin Laden is a fabricated performance driven by America’s
domestic politics.
In all of these articles, the representations of ‘America’ contain an automatic
assumption that anything that is believed to achieve American interests must have
extensive scheming and intentionality behind them. Killing the leader of the organization
responsible for September 11th is not enough to explain the event. The event is more
sinister than this goal and, in fact, the event is not even real. It is part of an intricate and
active scheme that involves timing, presidential election calculations, or other reasons. In
these representations, there are no bounds to what ‘America’ can do or fabricate. It could
be the force behind anything, especially if that anything is detrimental to Arabs.
Moreover, if anything is perceived as achieving an American interest, then it was also
planned and part of one of these elaborate and comprehensive schemes. ‘America” is
ultimately inescapable and the ultimate enemy. This binary is not only oppositional but
includes an ‘other’ who is frequently and actively on the offensive. That ‘other’ needs no
extensively defined reasons for these actions because the identity itself automatically
establishes the conflict.
The articles regarding America’s role in the Arab Spring also carry these same
assumptions in their representations. In the series of articles written by Rifaat Sayid
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Ahmed, Al Jazeera is represented as playing a part in America (and Zionism’s)
fabrication of Arab world events, including the Libyan and Syrian revolutions. He
discusses the testimony of Luna al-Shebl, a former employee of Al Jazeera who he says
resigned from her position in protest. According to the articles, she states that Al Jazeera
has a special private room, known as the “black room,” where news is fabricated,
particularly about Syria.136 Moreover, there has been an American plan for regime change
in Syria since the time of Bush and Blair, and that this current uprising is part of this plan.
In other words, “we” or Arabs should not support the Libyan or the Syrian revolutions
because they are actually CIA planned and part of a scheme to destabilize the region,
though Ahmed does not explain why this might be an American plan. It is represented as
simply a given and known truth. However, in contrast to these assertions, Ahmed also
states that “the only revolutions in the region are the Egyptian and Tunisian
revolutions…”137 These are the “real” or “clean” revolutions, and should therefore be
defended. They are for some reason not part of a regional destabilization plan.
In his articles a few days later, Rifaat Sayid Ahmed specifically targets foreign
NGO’s within Egypt as part of an American plan to “Americanize” Egypt’s revolution.
He asserts that Egypt’s true sons, its “real people” made the revolution, not these
activists, students, brokers and human rights centers that joined at the last minute to fulfill
America’s plans.138 He writes yet again the next day
We said yesterday that there are suspicious roles undertaken by some of the
human rights organizations and political activists to steal the revolution through
their cooperation with American and European institutions linked with and close
to American and Western intelligence. Today we will finish observing the most
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prominent of these Western institutions that work in Egypt to steal the revolution
and penetrate it in order to transform it into an American revolution (trivial) and
trivial Americanized revolutionaries.139
When taking all of his series of articles together, ‘America’ is represented as both being
complicit in fermenting chaotic and destabilizing revolutions in Syria and Libya, while
also trying to “steal” Egypt’s “pure” revolution in order to trivialize it (or to keep it from
being destabilizing). Explaining reasons behind America’s insidious intentions is never
undertaken, especially when it seems that if one takes into account all that ‘America’ is
supposed to be doing then its plans would actually seem irrational or conflictive in
nature. In this discourse, ‘America’ is simultaneously trying to destabilize the region and
keep revolutions under control. In other words, ‘America’ carries with it a meaning that
can be utilized in a multitude of ways, divorced from explanation, in order to accentuate a
point or prove something to be insidious and a threat to the ‘self.’ ‘America’ the ‘boogey
man’ lurking around every corner and being identified with ‘America’ is the most
damaging accusation that can be made because it is inherently ‘anti-Egypt,’ ‘anti-Arab,’
and ‘anti-revolution,’ ‘anti-democracy,’ etc.
One of the articles, not specifically within this theme, discusses the topic of how
affiliation with ‘America’ is the “kiss of death” for any political entity in post-revolution
Egypt. Manar al-Shorbagy140 writes a letter to President Obama telling him that it is
understandable that America pursues its interests (which do not lie with the Egyptian
revolution) and that he should think twice before listening to experts who argue for
American funding and training in Egypt. She actually encourages him to not support “our
revolution” because doing so would be counter productive (since ‘America’ is something
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you as an Egyptian must endeavor to not be associated with). She also places Egyptians
in a place of strength; the Egyptians were able to peacefully overthrow a regime that was
fully backed by America until the end. Therefore, Egyptians are in little need of
American assistance.
These representations of ‘America,’ and what al-Shorbagy acknowledges, but is
not a part of herself, are simplified and ambiguous. This ‘America’ is unquestioningly
hostile to true Egyptians, Arabs, and Muslims. It is the ‘other’ that is always actively
aiming to undermine ‘us,’ and can be seen everywhere. There is no need to look behind
why this ‘other’ is so adamant in ‘our’ destruction because it is represented as a given
truth that this constant menacing drive is present inside of it. Additionally, ‘America’ is
seen primarily as an intelligence apparatus and a state. It’s internal politics, citizens,
plurality, etc. makes no appearance to mention. ‘America’ is massively solid, always
“evil,” unified, and fully intentional. As its malevolence can be utilized in any scenario,
there exists no need to pair it with a fully “rationalized” explanation for events.
‘America’ can actually appear as the devious agent behind multiple events that, when
analyzed together, make little sense.

America and Egypt’s Sectarian Issue
Though America’s role in sectarianism is not one of the most prevalent themes
throughout the articles (it appears in two of them), it is interesting because sectarian
issues were not mentioned in any of the articles analyzed in the previous chapter. During
the same time frame as Osama bin Laden’s death, Egypt witnessed an outbreak of
sectarian violence in the Imbaba area of Cairo. This instance of sectarian strife prompted
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a significant amount of articles (more than Osama bin Laden’s death) and with it some
associated representations of ‘America,’ many of which overlap with previously
discussed representations.
The two authors who discuss America’s role in sectarianism place the ‘United
States’ on the side of the Coptic Christians. According to Selim Azuz141, the Copts
actually supported Hosni Mubarak and were not with the revolution. He also states that
they treacherously asked for protection from the United States during the sectarian
clashes, giving the US a pretext for intervention in Egypt’s internal affairs. Mohamed alShafay142 also echoes much of the same narrative. ‘America’ can be expected, as part of
its plans to divide Egypt, to come to the aid of the Coptic Christians and to actually create
a Coptic state in Egypt. Though he does not explain how, he more than suggests that
‘America’ is ultimately behind the sectarian strife in Imbaba. In this depiction, ‘America’
is functioning as the threat that is trying to divide the ‘self.’ In the face of such as threat,
all internal divisions must be quelled.
These articles can also be considered a subset of the articles discussed prior to this
section. ‘America’ in these articles functions in the same fashion in that it is trying to
unfold its sinister plots in Egypt. However, rather than functioning through NGO’s or
other “brokers,” it is affiliated with the Coptic Christians, thus taking on a sectarian tone.
Somehow the Coptic Christians are represented as more likely to be affiliated with the
‘United States’ than they are with ‘Egypt’ or the revolution. Malevolent and plotting
‘America’ functions as a means to slander the Copts, or function as al-Shorbagy’s
political “kiss of death.” It clarifies what and who is part of the ‘self’ or ‘Egypt’ and who
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is a threat to it. Furthermore, when ‘America’ is represented in this fashion, it focuses the
gaze on an external catalyst and its agents as the provocateurs for internal issues. It
becomes impossible that these events could stem from “real Egyptians” but only from a
nebulous, ever-present, and all-powerful entity that is ‘America.’ Therefore, internal
introspection of the ‘self’ is delayed or canceled in entirety, and the locus of action or
change also left to the demonized and powerful ‘other.’ Moreover, the ‘self’ must guard
against a force that is trying to divide and fracture it. Any divisions inherent within the
‘self’ must be remedied or ignored because they present to potential for exploitation from
the ‘other.’

America, the Counter-Revolution
In the context of the Arab Spring and the Egyptian revolution, ‘America’ is
always placed on the side of the old regime and/or the post 25 January counterrevolution. ‘America’ is actually a supporter of ‘authoritarianism,’ and engages in
‘imperialism.’ ‘America,’ contrary to its own discourse, is not about ‘democracy’ or
‘freedom,’ at least when it comes to Egypt and the Arab world. In fact, according to these
texts, it is the Egyptians who carry these values. Furthermore, if Arabs and Egyptians
continue to follow these values then they can overcome past domination. Therefore, the
core characteristics traditionally associated with ‘America’ in the dominant discourse,
actual become tools with which to “fight it.” As Mohamed al-Shafay states, “Americans
look for their interests and Zionism’s interests with customers and dictators. It is
necessary that we look for our interests with freedom, democracy, parity, dignity, and
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nationalism.”143 Al Bayati et al. write in a similar fashion though through an imperialist
as opposed to an anti-Zionist lens,
By depending on the people's interests and will, the Egyptian revolutionaries can
lift Egypt from blindly following US imperialist and compromising comprador
agents' diktats and build, both politically and economically, an independent Egypt
that bases its policies on the interests of the Egyptian people and on reciprocal
benefits with its friends. The imperialist crisis, the failure of liberal and neoliberal
globalisation, Egypt's potential together with Arab solidarity and cooperation,
would help in building a strong democratic modern and advanced Egypt in which
its people live in prosperity, justice, dignity and freedom.144
This representation splits the Egyptians and Arabs between regimes or comprador class
and the people. The interests of the regimes lie with a unified ‘America’ who has
objective interests. ‘America’ is rarely split between it government and population,
though it is often referred to as the “American administration.” In other words, ‘America’
is the government, and is presumed to also represent the people. Thus the American
government and the American people have the same interests, unlike how the situation is
represented in Egypt. Moreover, ‘America’ performs the function of representing the
previous regime as not part of the ‘self’ and against the interests of ‘Egypt.’ The
‘revolution’ and ‘revolutionaries’ are now part of the definition of ‘Egypt.’
Additionally, within this theme, the US is generally not an all-knowing or allpowerful entity but is represented as caught of guard by the Arab revolutions. The Arab
revolutions were not part of its calculation and went against American interests. The US
was taken aback and unsure of how to react to the situation, unlike the skillful magician
Obama presented in the last chapter. This theme is one of the rare cases where
representations of ‘America’ are associated with confusion, powerlessness, and even
irrationality. However, there also exist discourses that suggest that once ‘America’
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regained its feet and understood the situation, it started putting forth all its efforts to
control or outright “steal” the revolution. El-Hassan writes,
Today, the US may be tempted to use its old tricks to abort or dilute democratic
movements in the Arab states in order to ensure that small groups, "moderates"
according to the US, come to dominate the politics of the Middle East rather than
nationalists or Islamists who are perceived to be extremists in US eyes.145
Other authors are little more extreme in their representation of America’s actions
to “control” the Arab revolutions. According to Selim Azuz146, the current Egyptian
leaders have not been paying close enough attention to American plans for interfering in
Egypt’s internal matters. Before he attacks what he states are the American ambassador’s
arrogant orders (which he compares as reminiscent of the British High Commissioner of
the colonial era) in regards to investigating sectarian strife in Imbaba, he details his
representation of the American role in the Egyptian revolution. Although this is not the
case, ‘America’ is trying to represent itself as having played a role in the revolution,
particularly through it’s “agent” Wael Ghonim. According to Azuz, the US was against
the revolution the entire time, siding with former president Mubarak. He also discusses
two events: the “stolen” American embassy vehicles that ran-over and killed Egyptians
and Hillary Clinton’s famous “stability speech” at the beginning of the uprising. He
suggests that the vehicles were not in fact stolen, but intentionally given to the Interior
Ministry to kill protesters. Furthermore, Hillary Clinton’s speech was actually the “secret
password” to unleash the interior ministry’s forces in the protesters. Though this
representation of ‘America’ overlaps with other “conspiracy-theory” representations, it
still contains an element of confusion on the part of the ‘United States.’ The Americans
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were caught off guard and were ultimately trying to do “damage control” in order to
direct the revolution in the appropriate direction. ‘America’ is one step behind ‘Egypt’ in
this representation.

America’s Less Than Perfect Democracy
The final theme in this chapter was only present in one of the articles centering on
Osama bin Laden’s death and was not present in any of the articles in the previous
chapter. However, it is the first representation that actually questions the quality of
America’s democracy internally. In all other articles, America’s lack of democratic
quality is represented as being attached to its foreign policy. Regardless of being nondemocratic outside its own borders, it still often retains its place as the most advanced
and democratic nation in the world. In the linear path of modernization and development,
‘America’ is always the final destination or the perfect example. However, when ElHassan discusses the prospects for a new Arab nahda or renaissance, he outlines the
problems with US democracy and why it might not be the most desirable path to pursue
for Arabs. He writes,
There are questions about US democracy even today. The candidates with the
most money are the most likely to win US elections, and the rules employed in the
US presidential elections may not allow the candidate preferred by the majority of
voters to become president. When more than two candidates run for the office of
president, the winning candidate may also have a plurality of states but not a
majority of votes.
In fact, in 12 cases since the election of Andrew Jackson as president of
the US in 1828, the winning candidate has not been the first choice of the majority
of voters. This makes the US system even less democratic since the president's
power has been growing at the expense of the legislative branch. ”147
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There are multiple examples for Arabs to choose from on their path toward
‘democracy,’ not to mention extensive historical examples of challenges faced during
other transitions. However, ‘America’ is not necessarily the “best.” El-Hassan’s
representation of the Arab predicament certainly accentuates what he perceives as
daunting challenges ahead, but his text is unique in that it carries the idea that Arab actors
have the agency to choose their form of governance from a variety of historical
experiences. Even more, ‘America’ is represented as a complicated democratic system
that ultimately may not be the best or ideal model, should any model be followed. The
Arabs then have the right to critique and evaluate what ‘America’ usually holds a
monopoly on in dominant discourse: democracy.

B. Underlying Assumptions
As was the case in the preceding chapter, all of these texts carry in them an
assumption that the US has objective and static interests in Egypt and/or the Arab world.
Throughout the articles in this chapter, the US’s interests are represented as being in
opposition with the Egyptian revolution (though at times suggesting that this is not the
case with respect to the Syrian and/or Libyan revolutions). As a result, it becomes logical
and unquestionable that the US should promote authoritarianism or attempt to “steal
Egypt’s revolution” because these American interests are objective and unchangeable.
They are uncontested, unlike the definition of democracy or who truly represents
democracy. This assumption has repercussions on what action is available. It denies the
idea that America’s interests could be shifted or that they could eventually lie with the
“revolution.” In the new Egypt, now potentially more representative of the Egyptian
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people, America’s interests are inherently oppositional to Egyptian interests. It is a zerosum game in which the only recourse is to try to root out ‘America,’ its agents, and to
confrontationally face it. Or, in the very least, one must contain ‘America,’ thus devoting
considerable energy to it, in order to achieve Egyptian interests.
Additionally, the representation of ‘America’ is fairly simple and very static. It is
represented primarily as an unchanging force that exists everywhere, always actively
pursuing its agenda. It is detached from its location in ‘America’ and represented as
everywhere, primarily in the Middle East. Moreover, it is a hostile and completely
oppositional ‘other.’ It is a performative term that can used to paint others at home as
hostile, a threat, or somehow not Egyptian, such as NGO’s or the Coptic Christians. If
you are with ‘America’ you cannot be with ‘Egypt’ or the revolution. You are also with
‘Zionism’ or ‘Israel,’ which is rarely distinguished as a separate entity from ‘America.’
This oppositional force is always trying to divide and separate the ‘self’ or ‘Egypt’ in
order to destroy it. Thus the response must be to hold together, quell dissent, and stand
united in the face of an ambiguous threat that could be present anywhere.
Whether ‘America’ is represented as vengeful, simply pursuing strategic interests,
hated, etc., it is shown in these articles (as opposed to the previous chapter) to also be
weakened and less powerful as a result of its actions. Each of these themes point to
America’s violation of international norms and values, be they international law,
democracy, respect for human rights, etc. It is because ‘America’ is violating these
“essential truths,” and increasing its hatred internationally, that it will ultimately pay the
price or undo itself. Beneath this representation is the assumption that these elements are
in fact universal and objective truths. They reflect an acceptance of what was traditionally
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held to be ‘Western’ conceptualizations of the world system: the universality of
democracy, international law, human rights, etc. In other words, it reflects an
internalization of the dominant ontology for viewing the world system.
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CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS OF EGYPTIAN DISCOURSE AFTER THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN
BORDER CLASH
On 19 August 2011, the Israeli Defense Force (henceforth referred to as IDF)
crossed the Egyptian border into Sinai in pursuit of terrorists and, for widely contested
reasons, killed Egyptian soldiers in the process. This event sparked significant
controversy in Egypt, and ultimately resulted in a confrontational mass protest at the
Israeli embassy in Cairo and the evacuation of the Israeli ambassador from Egypt.148 The
discourse analyzed in this research covers the two weeks immediately following the
border clash. The dates range from 20 August-2 September 2011. The two issues from alAhram Weekly cover the time frame of 25-31 August and 8-15 September149 due to the
fact that it is a weekly publication and discourse prompted by this incident would have
occurred in later issues.
During the initial planning of this thesis, it was assumed that this incident would
have prompted extensive discourse about the United States because of its frequent
association with Israel in Egyptian and Arab discourse. However, while there were a
multitude of articles discussing Israel and the Camp David accords, this incident resulted
in the least discourse about ‘America’ of the three analyzed events. A total of 21 articles
featured significant representations of the United States: 3 from al-Ahram Weekly, 5 from
al-Masry al-Youm, and 13 from al-Dostor. As is the case in the previous chapter, many of
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the articles revolve around the Arab uprisings as a whole and are not always related to the
event itself (the IDF-Egyptian clash)150.

A. Major Themes and Representations
Some of the themes and representations of the United States discussed in this
chapter are very similar to previously discussed themes that appeared in the previously
discussed articles, displaying a continuity in how the ‘United States’ functions in
Egyptian discourse. However, many of these representations have shifted from their
previous shapes to produce a world where ‘Egypt’ is positioned with the initiative and
ability to act independently from ‘America’ and its domination. ‘America’ is generally
represented in a weaker position than it was in the preceding chapters.

American and Zionist Interests
American support of Israel and Zionism is a recurrent theme throughout all
chapters in this thesis. However, there is often variation in the space represented between
‘America’ and ‘Zionism’ or ‘Israel.’ In the two preceding chapters, many of the texts
represented the United States and Israel as two separate entities, and occasionally as
having separate objective interests. In the vast majority of the texts surround the IDF
clash on the Egyptian border, this previously depicted separation of interests and
identities is nearly nonexistent. Moreover, ‘America’ is attached more often to an
abstracted ‘Zionism’ as opposed to the nation-state of ‘Israel.’ The abstract “AmericaZionism” is large and static, yet it contains little other detail aside from a malicious
opposition to Egyptian and Arab interests.
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General Talaat Muslim’s151 article explicitly references this combination of the
United States and Israel. Throughout the text, he describes the challenges that he believes
are threatening Egypt. He expresses that he is worried that the Egyptian leaders and
Egypt as a whole is “unconscious” and not aware of everything occurring around it and in
it. Before he starts specifically discussing these challenges he states,
There is no doubt that the challenges that stem from Israel and the United States
are the most important of these challenges and it does not seem that we have a
vision of how to treat them. I want to indicate here the coming challenges from
Israel, despite that I am fully convinced that it is not possible that we separate
between the coming challenges from the United States or those contained by
Israel.152
In Muslim’s representation, there is no difference between the United States and Israel, at
least from the perspective of Egypt and the threat that this entity poses. Rifaat Sayid
Ahmed, like others who simply combine the term together, refers to the “ZionistAmerican enemy153” in his piece detailing conspiracies in the region and Egypt.
Mohamed al-Shafay describes the crime of Hosni Mubarak and his regime in obeying
“Zionist-American pressure”154 to marginalize Sinai. Gamal As’ad explains in more
detail why he considers there to be no difference between the United States and Israel. He
writes,
The thing that lifts and exalts and assures and consecrates the American-Israeli
relationship in the region is the consideration that Israel is the friend and partner
and colonial settlement base of America and that protects American interests in
the Middle East, this region that was and still continues to be a strategic treasure
to colonialization…155
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Not only is Israel represented as a protector of US interest, but it is also the physical
embodiment of American colonialism: its settler base.
Essam el-Erian156 also utilizes the America-Zionism157 representation though he
does not locate it as the primary regional actor in the Arab world. The text discusses the
history of events in the region, specifically related to Egypt’s role and leadership.
According to el-Erian, it was President Sadat’s death and Mubarak’s succession to the
presidency that ultimately caused Egypt to lose its role as the leader of the Arab world. In
other words, Mubarak was too incompetent to handle the challenges of the presidency
unlike his predecessor Sadat. The text represents the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq’s invasion of
Kuwait, etc. as the result of a power vacuum left by Egypt’s exit from its regional
leadership role. Iraq and others were trying to fill Egypt’s place. It was this situation that
also led the Gulf States to run to ‘America’ and ‘Zionism’ for protection. Therefore,
though ‘America’ and ‘Zionism’ are represented as oppositional and powerful entities,
they are not given full credit for the state of affairs in the Arab region. Recent history has
been a result of Egypt’s action or lack of action and skill, embodied by former president
Hosni Mubarak.
In all of these discussed discourses, ‘America’ is again a monolithic and
intentioned entity, which is combined with an equally monolithic ‘Zionism’ and/or
‘Israel.’ It is extensive, powerful, impenetrable, and unquestioningly hostile to ‘Egypt.’
The ‘America’ often represented as pluralistic in the first chapter has utterly disappeared
in this theme. Furthermore, this representation is combined with the additional
representation of the Middle East and the world in general as defined by objective
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strategic interests. It is rational for ‘America’ and ‘Israel’ to be combined in interests if
their identity is interpreted as being one and the same. This restrictive representation
produces the available action that Egyptians might pursue with respect to these American
interests. In dealing with this entity, one must deal with the combined power of
‘American-Zionism’ and the assumption that there is no difference in identities,
perspectives, or interests. It denies a possibility that these US interests are contestable,
separable, or oppositional to Israeli interests. It denies a possibility that American
interests could lie in another location, or that there is a way to engage in the struggle to
align them differently. Moreover, reproduces the discourse that there are such things as
‘interests’ in the ‘Middle East’ and that ‘America-Zionism’ should be attempting to
acquire or control them. It carries the same framework as American realist discourse
about the Middle East, its inherent strategic interests, in addition to the representation of
Israel as America’s unchanging friend and ally.

America, Containing Revolutions
Similar to the prior chapter, ‘America’ is represented as siding with the oldregime or counter-revolution in the context of the Arab Spring. In this event, this theme
takes on the idea of containment. Now that the evolutions have occurred, ‘America’ is
trying to do everything possible to control them or limit their impact. These
representations include the previous assertions that ‘America’ is “trying to steal the
revolution” and “put it in its little pocket158” to the milder representation of trying to
influence them. Alaa al-Aswany,159 in his discussion of the border incident, also
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discusses an article written by Noam Chomsky stating that America does not actually fear
Islamists but the true independence of Egypt. Furthermore, it will do everything in its
power to control what follows Mubarak (as was indicated by the attempts to push Omar
Suleiman or Ahmed Shafiq into the presidency immediately following Mubarak’s
departure). ‘America’ will pursue this route, or any route, regardless of ideology or a
presumed abhorrence of political Islam. America always pursues its strategic interests.
According to Magdy Ahmed Hussein160, who spends most of his article
discussing the Libyan revolution, the US will try to do whatever is best for its ‘interests,’
whether this involves dividing a country or keeping it unified. Regardless, US interests
are represented as oppositional to Arab revolutions and interests. They are challenges that
must be overcome. He writes,
In the second stage of the revolutions that overthrew similar dictators, the greatest
difficulty is when the Americans try to contain these revolutions and empty their
content from them, and preserve the normalcy of the Arab nations, only giving
them new names of rulers and some reforms in the nature of the political system
in them.161
Similar to Essam el-Erian’s article, Hussein ends stating that the success of the Arab
revolutions in Tunisia and Libya, in the face of the American challenge, is dependent of
the success of Egypt’s revolution. Therefore, it is in the hands of ‘Egypt’ to control the
fate of the Arab world and overcome the attempts to contain the revolutions in the region.
‘Egypt’ must not wait passively, but take action.
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America, the Inaccurate
Somewhat linked with the ‘America’ that needs to contain the Arab revolutions is
the theme that the US is inaccurate in its failure to predict or accurately assess these
revolutions. In many other discourses, of which Edward Said’s Covering Islam is an
example, the American inability to truly and accurately “see” the Arab world is part of its
power and is one of the predominant reasons for its “unjust” actions. For example, US
discourse that conflates ‘Islam’ and ‘terrorism’ has been held partially responsible for
producing the nature of the “war of terrorism” (afflicting predominantly the Arab/Muslim
world). In other words, this “blindness” does not necessarily harm ‘America’ but
somehow harms ‘Arabs’ or ‘Muslims.’ Furthermore, during the Obama’s visit and speech
in Cairo, much of the discourse revolved around controlling what Obama saw, or
performing for ‘America’ so it judges the situation in a manner favorable to one’s
interests, whether you are regime, civil society, etc. America’s perspective or gaze was
always represented as a source of power and contesting what is seen does not affect
American power but one’s own. However, in this chapter (in addition to the preceding
chapter) the inability of the United States to accurately “assess” the Middle East has
somehow caused it to be in a less powerful position.
Amin Shalabi162 writes about the surprise that American Middle East experts had
during the beginning of the Arab Spring and likens it to their dismay during the
September 11th attacks. He states that the US experts misjudged the affects of neoliberal
economic reforms, the impact of the military in politics, and the influence of Arab
nationalism in the region. He goes on to write that,
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It is well known that US civil society organs and the scholastic community, in
particular, are active participants in shaping US foreign policy thinking. In view
of the blurred crystal ball that American Middle East experts have used to probe
Arab societies, it was not odd that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would appear
before the television cameras in the early hours of the Egyptian revolution to
state, "The Egyptian regime is stable and Mubarak is a reliable ally of the US."
That assessment certainly did not withstand the onslaught of the Egyptian
revolution and it was not long before Washington decided that Hosni Mubarak
was no longer an ally but a burden.163
The US “probes” Arab societies and uses a “crystal ball.” Yet, in this representation, it
still does not have the ability to know or understand these Arab societies, much to its
detriment. The ‘Arabs’ have the ability to surprise ‘America’ and take their own actions
and initiatives that are not influenced by nor necessarily constrained by ‘America.’ The
US in this representation is the reactor who is playing catch-up. The ‘experts’ who are
paid to understand ‘Arabs’ are flawed in their gaze, unable to penetrate or understand.
Furthermore, though this text looks inside ‘America’ and sees civil society, Middle East
experts, and policy makers. Regardless, ‘America’ is still defined by its strategic interests
and has simply been unable to realize them as a result of its own deficiency. However, in
this representation it is still the case that ‘Egypt’ and the Arab world as a whole is
‘penetrated’ and ‘probed’ by ‘America.’ There is never a suggestion that ‘Egypt’ has the
possibility to do the same to ‘America,’ or that ‘America’ in can be penetrated internally.

Egypt goes to America
In all other articles analyzed in this thesis, the space or the setting for action
occurs in Egypt or the great Arab and/or Muslim world. Moreover, the Egyptians receive
actions from ‘America’ and the best available course of action remains resisting through
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decrying ‘America’s hypocrisy, not being duped by ‘America’ and knowing the
intentions behind such actions. In contrast to this represented situation, Mohamed alZiyat164 writes an article about the Egyptian Major General, Murad Muwafi (Director of
Egyptian General Intelligence), traveling to the United States during a crisis of EgyptianAmerican relations revolving around US funding of NGO’s in Egypt, the discovery of an
Israeli-American spy, and the heavy influx of American officials into Egypt in general. In
this discourse, ‘Egypt’ is going to ‘America’ to express its position and demands from a
level of equality. It is ‘America’ who must listen and receive. The rulers of Egypt,
represented positively and as part of the revolution in this article, will not be compliant
like the previous regime and will retain the ability to make all final decisions in Egypt (as
opposed to America). Al-Ziyat writes,
Indeed the Egyptian leaders are interested in clarifying the nature of the new
Egyptian reality, refusing any American attempts to restore the impact in
producing Egyptian political decisions internally and externally, and that the
American administration clearly understand that Egypt of the revolution
witnessed large change, including the orientation of foreign politics, and that it is
necessary that bilateral relations between Cairo and Washington be founded on
the mutual interest of each side, and that it is no longer acceptable to formulate
these relations to include the compatibility, aspirations, and demands of Tel Aviv,
and on account of the pressure of the Zionist lobby in the United States.165
In this representation, Egypt-American relations have arrived at a new juncture in which
the “new Egypt” will conduct its policies independent of American influence and in
accordance with its objective strategic interests. Furthermore, it is ‘Egypt’ informing the
‘US’ who must understand or ultimately face the consequences. Though the US political
system in understood by ‘Egypt,’ such as the effect of the Israeli lobby, this
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acknowledgement does not mean that ‘Egypt’ will tolerate relations that are not in its
interests. Like the theme depicting ‘America’ as inaccurate in its ability to understand the
Arab revolutions, this representation places ‘Egypt’ in more powerful position vis-à-vis
America.

America and Christian-Salafis
One of the twenty-one articles, written by Ahmed Roushdy, features
representations of ‘America’ but looks at the greater ‘Christian’ and ‘Muslim’ worlds as a
whole. He takes a unique stance on both Christian and Muslim extremists that he refers to
as Salafis. Throughout the article he explores the meaning of the word ‘Salafi,’ arguing
that it has been changed over time, and that the current individuals who identify
themselves as Salafis in the Arab world are not authentic or reflective of the original
meaning (and are actually Wahabis). The new meaning of Salafi, which he then applies to
some Christians, is related to a perverted extremism, which follows strict forms of
religious interpretation and sees the world as split into oppositional religions or
civilizations. The “Christian Salafis” are represented by individuals like Norway’s
Anders Breivik who, because of his hatred of Islam, killed ninety-three people and
advocated for a European crusade against Islam. The author then goes on to identify the
neoconservative movement within the United States as another strand of these “ChristianSalafis” who consider Islam to be the number one enemy. The two types of Salafis,
Christian and Muslim, feed from each other’s constructions of the world and have the
potential to lead to further chaos.
After the recent massacre by the Norwegian fanatic, it is not difficult to anticipate
more of the same from such Christian Salafis against Muslims and against so-
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called Muslim Salafis in particular. The Christian Salafis' certitude about the
dangers of Islam to Europe may turn into another crusading war. The so-called
Muslim Salafis and extremists will welcome this as a call for jihad, or religious
struggle. This will cause chaos, and the loser will be Islam and the Muslim
countries, though time will prove that the so-called Muslim Salafis are not really
genuine Salafis at all.166
The majority of the article actually focuses on Roushdy’s interpretation of the history of
Islamic thought, particularly with regard to the Salafi branch. He positively describes
Islamic thinkers like Mohamed Abdu as “true salafis” who do not see Islam as inflexible
in rules, consider ijtihad (or interpretation) a legitimate source law, and do not see
inherent opposition between ‘East’ and ‘West.’ His description of Mohamed Abdu and
Islam in general is worth quoting at length:
Abdu did not find a conflict between Islamic rules, properly interpreted
and understood, and modern scientific knowledge, a matter then neglected in
many Muslim countries. He also expressed his dissatisfaction with some Muslims'
behaviour. After his return from a trip to Paris, for example, Abdu said that "in
France I saw Muslims but no Islam. In Egypt I saw Islam but no Muslims." What
he meant was that Europeans were in some sense better Muslims since their
modern and democratic societies were applying the egalitarian principles of the
Quran more than traditional Islamic countries. Before Abdu's time, and up until
today, the genuine Salafist movement has been tarnished by extremists who
wrongly call themselves Salafis.
In reviewing the history of Islamic jurisprudence, one realises that the
political system established by the Prophet during his refuge in the city of AlMadina and after his victorious return to Mecca, was based on a civil, democratic
and just government that maintained equality among the people with no
discrimination between an Arab and a Persian, or between Muslims and nonMuslims.167
In Roushdy’s text, the binary between the ‘West’ and ‘Muslims’ is loosened and
intertwined. Each can have similar and compatible qualities. Moreover, none is inherently
hierarchical to the other. Though he discusses Abdu’s experience in encountering the
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‘democratic’ and ‘egalitarian’ societies of Europe, he adds that these values are actually
Islamic in origin. At one point he states that civilization Western actually owes its
development to Islamic civilization.
The representations in this text utilize similar ontology from Orientalist discourse
and Western discourse: civilizational categories, democracy as a universal truth, etc.
However, these representations are historically contextualized and their traditional
locations (democracy as lying in the domain of the ‘West’) are disturbed. In this text, not
only is ‘democracy’ not in opposition to ‘Islam,’ but is actually one of its original values.
Additionally, these values that are held in the dominant discourse to be inherently
‘Western’ or even ‘American’ were actually a transmuted from ‘Islam’ to the ‘West,’
performing the intertwining of the two civilizational categories. For Roushdy, this
relationship is the ‘truth’ and those who would struggle to construct the world into stark
oppositions, or ‘Salafis,’ are the greatest threat.

B. Underlying Assumptions
In all of these themes, excluding the last theme dealing with the label of ‘Salafi,’
the ‘United States’ is represented with elements of an unchanging and old order.
‘America’ is almost inseparable from ‘Zionism,’ the old authoritarian regime, and the
objective strategic interests that are supposed to lie with these entities. The representation
of ‘Egypt,’ however, has changed. It is no longer the old regime that is stagnant and that
bows to American and/or Israel interests. The ‘self’ is revolutionary Egypt, which has
overthrown domination by these old elements though it is still in a struggle with itself to
overcome the remaining elements of the old regime. The texts assert that ‘Egypt’ is
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changing, and is different from its past. It has new interests which lie with the people of
Egypt and not the prior regime, to which ‘America’ is paired. Moreover, it has the
opportunity to impact and influence its own fate and, at times, that of the region.
In previously discussed discourses, particularly in the chapter addressing
President Obama’s speech and visit to Cairo, ‘Egypt’ is represented as ‘static,’ ‘stagnant,’
and unchanging. ‘America’ is represented as flexible, hybrid, and able to rejuvenate itself
in order to face the crisis of the moment. This collection of discourses inverses this
relationship. ‘Interests’ do not change and ‘America’ is still trying to pursue them in any
manner possible. ‘America’ does not change and has always had the same agenda,
revolving around these same interests, in the region. ‘America’ is its old self and,
consequentially, is represented as weaker in power as a result. ‘America’ was unable to
predict the new Egypt, and understand the revolution, though it may try to control or
contain it. ‘America’ functions as a monolithic ‘other’ for the ‘new Egypt’ to actively
resist and define itself against.
Nevertheless, these representations still operate inside the dominant discourse of
‘strategic interests,’ ‘sovereignty,’ and the assumption that the Middle East and/or Arab
world contains these interests or even “strategic treasures” that various actors are trying
to control. It accepts sovereign states and rational pursuit of interests as the ontology of
the world. Moreover, relations between ‘America’ and ‘Egypt’ take place through this
prism of interests and sovereign nation states, and not through any other types of
relations. Therefore, dealing with ‘America’ or other foreign entities must either occur
internal to the state of Egypt, or through the official state apparatus. For example, ‘Egypt’
asserts itself to ‘America’ through General Muwafi’s visit to the United States. Other
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types of interaction and relations are precluded from these representations, thus
producing very specific course of action to be followed in carrying out these relations.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
The thesis has shown how ‘America’ has operated as an ‘other’ in the production of
the Egyptian ‘self,’ with each representation re-defining a ‘self’ with different attributes.
These ‘Americas’ and ‘Egypts’ all produce different available courses of action within
Egypt-American ‘relations’ as a whole. The examples within this case study also point to
a shift in representations of ‘America’ and ‘Egypt’ over the course of two years,
encompassing both pre and post-revolutionary Egypt. Nevertheless, most of the
narratives about ‘America’ still have their roots in prior discourse and representations.
Yet, especially after the 25 January 2011 events in Egypt, the representations and
meanings of ‘America’ are positioned in new locations and function in new ways.
In the articles focusing on Obama’s visit in Cairo, representations of ‘America’
were numerous and detailed. ‘America’ was often depicted as ‘plural,’ ‘youthful,’
‘regenerative,’ and ‘changing.’ Obama himself represented the very embodiment of
change. Additionally, though Obama’s rhetoric may not have reflected the true intentions
of ‘America,’ he was still ‘skillful,’ or a ‘magician’ who was able to ‘woo’ and
‘intoxicate’ his Egyptian audience. ‘America’ and Obama always ‘know’ what they are
doing and how to do it. This representation facilitates a sharp contrast with
representations of ‘Egypt;’ it is ‘old,’ ‘stagnant,’ ‘oppressed,’ living in past glory,
‘wounded.’ This binary of representation is almost an exact replica of orientalist
discourse. Whether these discourses blame ‘America,’ Egyptians themselves, or another
entity, the binary remains hierarchical, placing ‘America’ ahead of ‘Egypt’ on a
teleological trajectory of progress. As it has been located throughout more than a century
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of intellectual thought, ‘Egypt’ is trying to catch up to the modern world.
There are also other representations of ‘America’ as powerful that fall outside of
this specific binary. For example, regardless of whether President Obama is interpreted as
the performer who is giving the speech, or the observer who is seeing ‘Egypt,’ he is
placed in a more powerful position vis-a-vis ‘Egypt.’ The audience is wooed by his
‘poisoned honey’ and his ‘access’ to them as a ‘colored’ president with both ‘third world’
and ‘Islamic’ origins. What Obama sees and interprets from his visit to ‘Egypt,’ whether
it is ‘real’ or not, is represented as a subject for struggle between Egyptian actors. Often
the goal is to fit within the American framework of ‘moderate,’ so that ‘America’ will
look upon you as a friend. It is imperative to ensure that other actors and groups, such as
the Muslim Brotherhood, do not achieve such a label in American eyes because this
favorable interpretation would empower those groups. In many ways, ‘America’ is like
parent that must be convinced of one’s side so that rewards will follow and be kept out of
the reach of others. To have power in ‘Egypt,’ one must generally deal with ‘America.’
Underneath this dynamic lies the assumption that ‘America’ as a force in ‘Egypt’ is
unchanging and present. ‘America’ is always in ‘Egypt.’
Representations of ‘America’ in the events following Obama’s speech in Cairo
(Osama bin Laden’s death and the IDF incursion) generally take on a more reified, and
abstract form. With a few key exceptions, there is very little depiction of anything
internal to the ‘United States,’ aside from Obama’s re-election concerns and the Israeli
lobby. ‘America’ is a sinister force present inside the borders of ‘Egypt,’ and it has secret
dealings and paid agents oriented around aborting the Egypt revolution, possibly dividing
‘Egypt,’ furthering ‘Zionist’ interests, etc. Moreover, it is intentioned, rational, and
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unitary; it is not plural. It is also the antithesis of ‘Egypt’ or the complete oppositional
‘other.’ Represented as an existential threat, ‘America’ is used as a tool in the struggle to
define who is ‘Egyptian,’ or with the revolution, and who is not. The old regime is
always placed as in cahoots with ‘America,’ and is therefore not part of true ‘Egypt’ but
an alien force that had played the part in oppressing ‘Egypt.’ In other occasions, groups
like the Coptic Christians, NGOs, and individuals like Wael Ghonim, are represented as
associated with ‘America’ and therefore not part of ‘Egypt’ and a threat. Ultimately,
these types of representations of ‘America’ are associated very little with the ‘United
States’ but are used for internal political struggles. Such representations function to
eliminate difference within Egypt or the ‘self’ in the face of a sinister and plotting
‘America.’
The representations of ‘America’ post-25 January are not always positioned in a
hierarchical location to ‘Egypt,’ though ‘America’ is still represented as a threat. In many
cases, even those involving a sinister ‘CIA America,’ the United States is depicted as
having been caught off guard by the Egyptian revolution and ultimately the actions of
Egyptians. It is playing catch-up to Egypt. ‘America’ is not always “all-knowing,” nor
does it necessarily have the capability to affect the change it wants to occur within
‘Egypt.’ Additionally, there are also some representations that do look ‘inside’ America,
and place it in a geographic location other than ‘Egypt.’ In al-Ziyat’s168 article, General
Muwafi is going to America to convey Egyptian intentions and announce that ‘Egypt’
will be independent and free from American meddling in its internal affairs. Moreover,
‘America’ will have to be aware of and respect this position or it will pay the price. It is a
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representation where ‘Egypt’ is depicted as acting and seizing the initiative. For elHassan169, even ‘America’ does not represent the pinnacle of democratic progress
because it too has flaws in its internal political system. ‘America’ is no longer the endstate on a teleological path to modernity and, in fact, ‘Egypt’ might have the opportunity
to better perfect it.
Although there exist multiple representations of ‘America’ and ‘Egypt’ within the
Egyptian discourse analyzed in this thesis, there also lays a deeper observation that
applies to the majority of articles. In almost all instances, there exists a normalization of
the same underlying framework, or ontology, as much of American discourse, both realist
and liberal. As a result, this thesis is predominantly in agreement with Joseph Mossad’s
findings:

The most successful pedagogy that Orientalism and the colonial encounter would
bequeath to these Arab intellectuals was not, however, the production of the
national historiographical response, although that was indeed part of it, but an
epistemological affinity that would inform all their archaeological efforts.170
As has been discussed extensively, much of Egyptian discourse structures the world
as based on objective strategic interests; it produces a world based on the basic tenets of
realism. That is, these strategic interests do not change and are part of the “real world”
that is separate from discourse, identity, social relations, etc. These interests are not open
for negotiation as to whether they are really strategic interests or not, or whether they
might be related to identity, perception, etc. As a result, it is “rational,” or it becomes
normalized for a nation-state to pursue these interests, whether they fly counter to values
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or not. Therefore, though America is often criticized in the text for forsaking democracy
and human rights, it is still understood that it is taking these actions in pursuit of strategic
interests. Moreover, the Middle East and Egypt are a “strategic treasure” in the world that
is to be struggled over, just as it has been during the colonial era, American neocolonial
era, etc.
These representations of America structure the nature of Egyptian-American
relations, what constitutes these ‘relations,’ and construct available courses of action for
actors. In these representations of the world, ‘relations’ occur between governments.
They are literally about state-to-state relations. What is internal to the nation-state, i.e.
‘America,’ is represented through the organs of the government and is therefore erased as
part of the representation. Indeed, while depictions of Egypt are rich and multi-faceted,
always distinguishing between the regime and the people, ‘America’ is rarely represented
in this fashion. ‘America’ is distinguished as the Obama administration, or a more
abstract ‘America’ or even ‘American-Zionism.’ Therefore, relations with ‘America’
occur through this official channel alone. This assumption restricts who has the ability to
have what constitutes as ‘relations’ with ‘America,’ i.e., official government channels
only (and subsequently restricts who in America has ‘relations’ with Egypt). These
relations are not represented as encompassing interactions between civil societies,
corporations, or other entities that transcend the boundaries of nation-states. In fact, it is
often when ‘America’ is found outside these traditional official boundaries that it is
represented as a sinister and interfering ‘foreign hand,’ which is trying to divide the
Egyptian ‘self.’
It is not only the realist perception of the world that makes an appearance in
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Egyptian discourse. In the process of critiquing America for violating its values comes
the underlying agreement on what constitutes American values: freedom, democracy,
human rights, etc. Additionally, these values are accepted by the discourse as universal
truths that should be sought out and adhered to. Though ‘America’ may be violating its
own rules as to what constitutes the world order, Egyptian discourse still agrees with
American (particularly liberal) discourse on the make-up of that order.
Adoption of the ontology of the dominant discourse does not inherently eliminate
any possibility for representations within this framework to alter power-relations or
potential for action. In other words, it is not wholly necessary to throw off the “shackles”
of the dominant discourse in order to resist. In some cases, the internalization of the
dominant discourse is not fully complete and hybridization can occur, as was seen in the
representation of the United States as a terrorist state. Reversing the relationship that is
articulated in the discourse of ‘the war on terrorism,’ it becomes the ‘United States,’ who
as a nation-state, not an illegal-combatant, is outside of the borders of the accepted world
order and is not playing by the ‘rules.’ It is the murderer and criminal that does not reflect
the values of democracy, and human rights. More over, it becomes the Egyptians or
Arabs as a whole that are represented as espousing, and reflecting these values,
particularly after the events of the Arab Spring. Though this reversal is still playing out
within in same ontology, meanings and locations have shifted from their normalized
locations, namely American monopoly over ‘democracy’ and its presumed leadership of
the world order. The arrangement of signs also changes the arrangement of power,
exhibiting a contestation and resistance of American discourse and power that is not
always starkly oppositional and has the potential to slip past the holds of domination.
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To conclude, this thesis has proceeded with the assumption that there is a relevant
Egyptian side to discourse within the context of Egyptian-American relations that also
contributes to the dynamics within the relations. It has demonstrated that like the
discourse emanating from the United States, the discourse in Egypt also contains
constructions of ‘self’ and ‘other,’ which also have varying implications for the power
relations between United States and Egypt, in addition to implications for Egypt’s
internal political struggles. Additionally, Egyptian discourse and its representations of
‘America’ also often intertwine with American dominant discourse, and much of it has
operated from the same frameworks and ontology as the dominant American discourse.
Yet, even so, there are changes across time and anomalies in the group that produce a
different ordering of the world and the Egypt-American relationship. Articulations within
the framework of the dominant discourse still produce different social realities and power
relations that affect the relationship. Moreover, articulations within the same ontology are
still capable of resistance, and at times even hybridization and transcendence.
The research within this thesis, as was established in the introduction, was directed
entirely towards understanding Egyptian discourse and its impact on Egypt and
Egyptians. While understanding and being aware of these discourses may be of interest to
certain audiences in the United States, this thesis is neither about the United States nor a
prescription for its foreign policy. Additionally, this thesis originally began with the
ambition of further analyzing the enabling and constraining factors for action produced
by the representations within Egyptian discourse. However, due to the scope and
complexity of the project, this aspect of the discourse was only briefly touched upon.
Further research could build upon the information developed within this thesis and
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analyze the impact of these representations on Egyptian actors, such as their effects on
the formulation of Egyptian foreign policy.
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